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Abstract 
Labour and environmental provisions became a prominent feature in trade 
agreements nowadays. Since 2011, the European Union devotes a whole chapter in 
its trade agreements to these issues - the trade and sustainable development (TSD) 
chapter. This paper argues that an important aspect of the EU’s approach are the 
institutional mechanisms which monitor the implementation of the TSD chapter. 
Applying the external governance approach to the mechanisms helps understanding 
how effective the EU’s approach is in ensuring the export of rules. The effectiveness 
of the institutional mechanisms, consisting of intergovernmental and civil society 
bodies and their interactions, is the core of this research. By process tracing the 
effectiveness of the institutional mechanisms for the case of the EU-Korea free 
trade agreement, this paper shows that the mechanisms’ contribution varied across 
labour, environmental and cross-cutting issues. Comparability across issues is 
restricted. However, it can be stated that for most issues the effectiveness was 
limited and the mechanisms led to dialogue and limited cooperation. The data was 
based on official meeting documents, interviews and reports. Possible factors for 
the variation are identified, among them political willingness, civil society 
engagement and the involvement of international organizations.  
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1. ‘Modern’ trade agreements – combining trade 
with labour rights and environmental protection 
In the context of stagnating progress in the current World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Doha Round, the large trade powers, as for example the EU and U.S., seem 
to have lost their faith in multilateral approaches to global trade. In the absence of 
multilateral solutions, a competition takes place on which countries are setting the 
standards in global trade. The increase in bilateral trade agreements is an indication 
for this trend. Trade agreements can be used as a tool to agree on common standards 
or to even export the own standards to the trade partner. The potential to set global 
standards was especially highlighted in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership agreement (TTIP) between the European Union and the 
United States. Besides the increase in bilateral trade agreements, another 
development has occurred. The provisions in the bilateral trade agreements cover 
increasingly more areas beyond the traditional trade in goods. The inclusion of 
services, intellectual property rights or public procurement are just some examples. 
Many other non-trade issues have found their way into agreements. Most 
interestingly, provisions on labour standards and environmental protection are 
increasingly more prominent. The United States as well as the European Union are 
among those states which include labour and environmental provisions in their trade 
agreements. This development started in the mid-90s. Since then, it became more 
and more established practice to include human rights, environmental protection 
and labour right in trade agreements (Horn et al. 2010, p. 1566). 
Even though trade policy tends to be overlooked by foreign policy research, studies 
have targeted labour rights, human rights and environmental provisions in trade 
agreements. Scholars have compared the design of provisions, especially between 
EU and U.S. agreements (among others Leeg 2018). Furthermore,  authors pointed 
at differences in the design and the reasons behind the set-up (among others Lechner 
2016; Adriaensen and González-Garibay 2013) as well as the role of different 
actors, as for example parliaments, in the negotiation of the provisions. (among 
others Meissner 2016; Sicurelli 2015; Mckenzie and Meissner 2017). It has been 
further researched how the provisions are enforced in case the trade partner does 
not follow the provisions. The discussion is often linked to comparing the U.S. 
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enforcement model to the EU model. Whereas the EU model is regarded as ‘soft’ 
due to its reliance on co-operative enforcement mechanisms, the U.S. model is 
regarded as ‘hard’ due to the possibility of sanctions (among others Moore and 
Scherrer 2017; Bastiaens and Postnikov 2014). Recently, special attention has been 
given to the effectiveness of the provisions. Authors have highlighted the lack of 
literature on the impacts of the provisions on the trade partner and have started to 
research this field (Orbie et al. 2017). The results have been divergent. Some 
authors have found rather limited impact of EU provisions in the case of trade 
agreements with Korea (Roozendaal van 2017) and Peru (Orbie et al. 2017), 
whereas one of the first large-N studies suggests a positive effect of labour 
standards in EU and U.S. agreements (Bastiaens and Postnikov 2014).  
Related to this academic challenge is a practical development in EU trade policy. 
Since 2011, the EU dedicates an own chapter for sustainable development to labour 
and environmental provisions in all its trade agreements. These trade and 
sustainable development (TSD) chapters are part of the ambition stated in the EU 
trade strategy ‘Trade for All’ “to ensure that economic growth goes hand in hand 
with social justice, respect for human rights, high labour and environmental 
standards, and health and safety protection” (European Commission 2014, p. 22). 
The introduction of an extra chapter on sustainable development is a new approach 
in EU trade policy. It belongs to the EU’s ‘modern’ ’new generation’ trade 
agreements which are more comprehensive than EU trade agreements have been 
before. They cover a larger variety of issues beyond usual trade provisions. 
Sustainable development is one of the non-trade issues included in the agreements. 
A factor, which fostered the creation of sustainable development chapters, is the 
Lisbon treaty. Since the Lisbon treaty entered into force in 2009, trade policy is 
embedded in the general framework of the EU’s external objectives and the EU is 
obliged to promote values such as human rights and sustainable development in its 
external relations. The Parliament’s consent is necessary for the ratification of trade 
agreements. On this base, the Parliament made the inclusion of TSD chapters a 
precondition for its consent to trade agreements by stating in a resolution that it 
“[c]onsiders an ambitious sustainable development chapter to be an essential part 
of any agreement” (European Parliament 2007, para. 14). It further raised criticism 
about the effectiveness of the chapters in the case of the EU-Korea free trade 
agreement (European Parliament 18.05.2017). With the publication of a discussion 
7 
 
paper in July 2017  the European Commission addressed the ongoing discussion 
about the effectiveness of the TSD chapters and its mechanisms which was 
challenged by civil society and the European Parliament (European Commission 
2017). 
Recent research however has just started to investigate aspects of the TSD 
mechanisms such as civil society involvement and lacks an in-depth study of the 
effectiveness of the whole institutional mechanisms established by the chapters. 
Research has, for example, uncovered the varying degree of civil society 
involvement in EU agreements and has pointed at the lack of research on the actual 
functioning and effectiveness of civil society involvement (Martens et al. 2018). 
Another study concerned with the EU’s model has called for more research on the 
actual functioning of the mechanisms (Kommerskollegium - National Board of 
Trade Sweden 2016). Furthermore, research has often focused on labour provisions 
and neglected environmental provisions and cross-cutting issues. This paper is 
contributing to this challenge in the literature by taking one step back from literature 
on the effectiveness of the provisions and looks at the institutional mechanisms 
behind the implementation of the provisions. It goes beyond researching the impact 
of civil society involvement and analyses the whole mechanisms of 
intergovernmental and civil society interactions.  
Contributing to both the academic and practical debate this paper is going to 
research the question: How effective are the institutional mechanisms in EU trade 
and sustainable development chapters in contributing to the implementation of the 
chapters? 
The TSD chapters set up three main institutional structures to monitor the 
implementation. These structures and their interactions represent the institutional 
mechanisms of the TSD chapters and are the core of the analysis in this paper. The 
monitoring is assigned to an intergovernmental committee which is overseeing the 
implementation and is advised by two civil society bodies. The intergovernmental 
body is usually called ‘trade and sustainable development committee’ (TSDC) or 
‘sub-committee on trade and sustainable development’. It is in the further referred 
to as the intergovernmental committee. The committee is supported in its 
monitoring function by civil society from the EU and the partner country. The civil 
society is supposed to meet regularly in so-called ‘domestic advisory groups’ 
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(DAGs) but also in a broader set-up as ‘civil society forum’ (CSF). The institutional 
mechanisms are outlined in detail in chapter two. In preparation for the later 
analysis, which traces the contribution of the mechanisms in the case of the EU-
Korea agreement, the functioning of the mechanisms is described. Furthermore, the 
chapter describes the provisions in the Korean TSD chapter as a base for assessing 
effectiveness. 
The research question is part of a bigger discussion on how effective the EU and 
also other countries are in exporting their rules and values. The ‘external 
governance’ approach is suitable to address this question because it looks at “the 
expansion of EU rules beyond EU borders” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 
p. 807). The approach has been applied for example in the context of EU 
enlargement but also to other countries as for example to the United States. In this 
paper, external governance is serving as a conceptual framework for analysing the 
institutional mechanisms which oversee the implementation of the trade and 
sustainable development chapters. The aim is to assess how effective they are in 
contributing to the implementation of the TSD chapter and thereby eventually to 
the successful export of rules. The focus lies on the last step of a rule transfer, which 
is the implementation. The institutional mechanisms are regarded as effective, when 
they contribute to a more consistent implementation of the chapters. The EU 
approach was categorized as network-based external governance in comparison to 
hierarchical governance which relies on binding rules, enforcement and in some 
cases sanctions (Oehri 2015). By applying the external governance framework to 
the TSD mechanisms, this paper can give further insights into the effectiveness of 
network-based governance. This is especially relevant since the EU’s approach 
represents the most comprehensive and institutionalised network-based governance 
when it comes to international trade agreements (Internationales Institut für 
Arbeitsfragen 2015). 
The contribution of the institutional mechanisms is a process which unfolds over 
time and effects might not appear immediately. Process tracing represents a suitable 
method to follow up the changes initiated by the institutional mechanisms. The EU-
Korea agreement represents an especially suitable case since it was the first 
agreement with a TSD chapter and served as a blueprint for the following 
agreements. By looking at the official meeting documents of the institutional 
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mechanisms and reports by the European institutions and by conducting interviews 
with the European participants in the meetings, the paper can assess in-depth the 
process of change. This allows to shed light on the question how effective the 
institutional mechanisms are and thereby adds substantially to the identified 
knowledge gap. The analysis of the TSD mechanisms in the EU-Korea agreement 
identifies the main issues which were raised by the institutional mechanisms and 
traces how they were followed up. The definition of effectiveness depends on what 
is understood as a consistent application. In this paper, a consistent application is 
defined based on the commitments in the agreement and can range from 
commitments to cooperate up to commitments to ratify and implement conventions. 
It has to be acknowledged that the mechanisms work in both directions and can also 
lead to the identification of shortcomings in the EU’s implementation. However, 
the TSD are an EU invention. Therefore, the focus in this analysis lies on the export 
of the TSD provisions to Korea. 
Due to the different nature of labour, environmental and cross-cutting issues the 
analysis is divided by six topics. The issues cover the ratification of ILO 
(International Labour Organization) conventions (freedom of association, 
collective bargaining and forced labour), the implementation of ILO convention 
111 on discrimination, emission trading schemes, illegal logging, circular economy 
and corporate social responsibility. The results show a diverse picture. The 
institutional mechanisms contributed to dialogue on the ratification of fundamental 
ILO conventions which Korea had not yet ratified. However, due the lack of 
concrete cooperation and steps towards the ratification, the effectiveness was 
evaluated as rather limited. The mechanisms were more effective and led to 
cooperation on the implementation of the ILO convention 111 on discrimination. 
The convention has been ratified by Korea, but concerns had been raised on the 
implementation. The contribution is rated as effective in the case of emission 
trading schemes where the exchange in the mechanisms led to cooperation in a joint 
project. In the case of illegal logging the mechanisms led to dialogue but the EU 
side request to cooperate was not taken up. The mechanisms contributed further to 
dialogue and limited cooperation on circular economy. The intention to cooperate 
on corporate social responsibility was raised but has not been followed up yet. Since 
the mechanisms did not lead to cooperation, the effectiveness was rated as rather 
limited. The process tracing further uncovered intervening factors such as 
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politically sensitive issues, civil society engagement on an issue or the presence of 
representatives from international organizations. In total, the analysis helped to 
understand how effective the institutional mechanisms are and what factors might 
constrain or foster their effectiveness. This has implications for the general 
effectiveness of TSD chapters and their provisions which should be taken into 
account when assessing them. 
In short, this paper is going to research the effectiveness of the institutional 
mechanisms by first outlining the set-up of the institutional mechanisms and the 
commitments connected to labour, environmental and cross-cutting issues. Then it 
will introduce the external governance approach and the definition of effectiveness 
based on the approach. Further, the paper explains how process tracing is applied 
as research method and which material is used for the tracing. Finally, the process 
tracing is conducted, the results are discussed and implications for future research 
identified. 
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2. Trade and sustainable development chapters – 
institutional mechanisms and provisions 
Since 2011, the EU includes an extra chapter on trade and sustainable development 
in all its trade agreements. The trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters 
cover provisions on labour standards and the protection of the environment. To 
ensure that these provisions are followed by both the EU and its trade partner, the 
chapters create committees to monitor the implementation. These institutional 
structures and their interactions are the centre of this paper and constitute the 
institutional mechanisms. This paper wants to assess the effectiveness of the 
institutional mechanisms. Therefore it needs to look at how the institutional 
mechanisms are contributing to the implementation. This requires to first describe 
the institutional mechanisms themselves. Second, it is also necessary to look at 
which provisions and commitments are covered by the chapter. This step is 
especially relevant for the later assessment of effectiveness. As mentioned before, 
Korea was the first country to have a TSD chapter in its trade agreement with the 
EU. The TSD chapter was used as a blueprint for following agreements. 
Considering this and in preparation for the later analysis the institutional 
mechanisms and provisions on labour and environment are described for the EU-
Korea agreement. Keeping in mind that trade agreements are the outcome of a 
negotiation between the EU and its trade partners, major differences in the 
mechanisms or the set-up of the provisions compared to other agreements are 
highlighted. This allows for a better generalizability of the findings to other 
agreements with TSD chapters. 
2.1. The institutional mechanisms in the chapter 
The TSD chapter sets up three main institutional structures to monitor the 
implementation of the chapters. The monitoring is assigned to an intergovernmental 
committee which is overseeing the implementation and is advised by two civil 
society bodies. The intergovernmental body is usually called ‘trade and sustainable 
development committee’ or ‘sub-committee on trade and sustainable development’. 
It is in the further referred to as the intergovernmental committee. The committee 
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is supported in its monitoring function by civil society from the EU and the partner 
country. The civil society is supposed to meet regularly in so-called domestic 
advisory groups but also in a broader set-up as Civil Society Forum. In addition, 
both sides commit to assign an office as a contact point in their administration. 
These basic structures can be found in all TSD chapters negotiated so far. 
The intergovernmental committee allows for a dialogue between the EU’s trade 
department (DG Trade) and its partner countries’ officials on the implementation 
of the chapter. How often the body meets varies from agreement to agreement. With 
Korea the agreement foresees the first meeting within one year after the entering 
into force and after that as seems necessary (Council of the European Union 2010, 
Art. 13.12). So far, the intergovernmental committee has alternately met in Brussels 
and Seoul six times in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017 and 2018. It was co-chaired 
by officials from DG Trade and the Korean ministries for employment and labour 
and environment. 
The concept of domestic advisory groups has been first introduced in an agreement 
(Economic partnership agreement) with the CARIFORUM, a group of Caribbean 
countries, in 2008. The main function of the DAG is as stated in the Korean 
agreement “advising on the implementation of the Chapter” (Council of the 
European Union 2010, Art. 13.12). In comparison to previous civil society 
engagement, the DAGs represent a more institutionalized form of engagement. As 
mentioned above the DAGs are build out of civil society representatives from each 
country. There is an individual DAG for the EU and another DAG for the trade 
partner. The DAGs mainly consist of three groups of representatives in the fields of 
labour, environment and business but might include also NGOs in other areas.1 The 
selection criteria for members of the DAGs is left to the countries to decide (Orbie 
et al. 2016a, pp. 528–529). However, the Korean agreement specifies that 
representatives need to be independent whereas the Peru-Colombia-EU agreement 
does not mention such a requirement. The independence criteria has however not 
been respected for example in the case of Honduras (Martens et al. 2016, p. 5). In 
Korea, the EU DAG criticised the composition of the Korean DAG which led to a 
change in the composition in 2014. The EU side argued that the Korean DAG is not 
                                                          
1 The DAGs may also include other relevant stakeholders or academics as it was the case for the 
EU-Korea agreement. 
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independent because it consisted to a large extent of academics which were 
associated with the Korean government and did not include the Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) (Putte van den 2015, p. 229). 
The Civil Society Forum is a transnational dialogue forum where the DAGs from 
each party can meet. With Korea, the DAGs choose 12 representatives from their 
own DAG members and other civil society representatives may participate as 
observers (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2013a). The EU-Korea Forum has been 
held so far six times in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017 and 2018. It became 
established practice that a summary of the last intergovernmental meeting is 
presented to the forum (TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2013). Another 
modification is that the Co-Chairs of the Civil Society Forum are participating in 
the intergovernmental committee and present the outcomes of the last Civil Society 
Forum to the committee. Furthermore, it was decided to hold the meetings back-to-
back which means first the Civil Society Forum and then the intergovernmental 
committee.2 The TSD chapter does not specify in how far the opinions of the DAGs 
and the CSF need to be taken into consideration. However, the intergovernmental 
committee has committed to take the opinions into account and to report back on 
the follow up (Putte van den 2015, p. 229).  
There is a formal procedure in the TSD chapter that can be initiated by the EU or 
its trade partner when the other side is not complying with the chapter. Triggering 
this procedure is one formal way how the institutional mechanisms can ensure a 
better implementation. In case a dispute on the implementation of the TSD chapter 
arises, the other government may request a formal government consultation. In a 
first step, the governments talk to each other and try to resolve the issues. If this is 
not successful, the intergovernmental committee can as a second step be 
commanded to come to a resolution of the issue. During the process the ILO and 
other international bodies as well as the DAGs may be consulted (Council of the 
European Union 2010, Art. 13.14). If the government consultation is still not 
successful, the governments may consult a panel of experts which advices on 
possible solutions to the dispute. The recommendations of the panel are however 
                                                          
2 The meetings were hold back-to-back in the years from 2012 until 2015 and in 2018. In 2017 a 
meeting back-to-back was not possible. The CSF meeting document in 2017 mentions technical 
explanations on the Korean side and the second EU DAG letter refers to complications from the 
Korean government. In the meeting minutes of the fifth intergovernmental it is stated that Korea 
would not see a problem in holding the meetings not back-to-back. 
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non-binding and there are no remedies to sanction non-compliance (Council of the 
European Union 2010, Art. 13.15). It is worth noting that the trade agreement has 
a general dispute settlement mechanism with the option for remedies. However, this 
mechanism does explicitly not apply to the trade and sustainable development 
chapter. 
2.2. The provisions on labour rights, environmental 
protection and cross-cutting issues in the chapter  
The TSD chapters include provisions on labour and environmental protection. In 
the Korean TSD chapter, the labour provisions refer to international standards of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO). The environmental provisions refer 
as well to international agreements, the Multilateral Environment Agreements they 
have signed.  Furthermore, an annex to the TSD chapter identifies areas for 
cooperation which touch upon both labour and environmental issues.  
When it comes to labour standards, the TSD chapter requires compliance with 
internationally recognised labour standards namely the ILO core labour standards. 
These core standards are covered by the eight fundamental ILO conventions. They 
refer to four principles:  
• “freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining; 
• the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; 
• the effective abolition of child labour; 
• and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation” (International Labour Organization (ILO) 1996-2018). 
The EU and Korea “commit to respecting, promoting and realising, in their laws 
and practices, the principles concerning the fundamental rights”, “to effectively 
implementing” the already signed ILO conventions and to “make continued and 
sustained efforts towards ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as the 
other Conventions that are classified as ‘up-to-date’ by the ILO” (Council of the 
European Union 2010, Art. 13.4.3). These commitments towards ratifying core and 
up-to-date ILO conventions and to enforce them in practice are an essential part of 
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the labour provisions in the chapter. Scholars have referred to the core labour 
standards also as being “the heart of the EU’s model” (Harrison et al. 2018, p. 11). 
The provisions on environment are less specific. Similar to the labour provisions, 
the chapter includes the commitment to effectively implement the multilateral 
environmental agreements which each side has signed so far. A reference is further 
made to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its 
Kyoto Protocol where the chapter reinforces the commitment to reaching the 
framework’s objectives. Furthermore, it is aimed to cooperate multilaterally on the 
future international climate change framework in line with the Bali Action Plan. 
(Council of the European Union 2010, Art. 13.5). Further references are made in an 
annex to the chapter. 
The environmental issues of emission trading schemes, illegal logging and circular 
economy and the cross-cutting issue of corporate social responsibility fall under the 
annex 13. The annex 13 outlines areas for cooperation on trade and sustainable 
development. It provides an “indicative list” which suggest exchange of 
information and cooperation on trade-related issues in the following areas (Council 
of the European Union 2010, Annex 13, p. 1335): 
1) impacts of the agreement on sustainable development 
2) cooperation on social and environmental issues in the international fora 
3) promoting the ratification of fundamental and other ILO conventions and 
multilateral environmental agreements 
4) corporate social responsibility 
5) impacts of environmental provisions on trade 
6) international climate change regime 
7) biodiversity 
8) sustainable fishing practices 
9) deforestation and illegal logging 
10) multilateral environmental agreements including customs cooperation 
11) ILO Decent Work Agenda 
12) Connection between multilateral environmental agreements and international 
trade rules 
13) Other ways of environmental cooperation 
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The commitments under Annex 13 are restricted to dialogue and co-operation and 
do not, as it is the case for labour standards, include concrete commitments to ratify 
or implement conventions. 
In regard to already existing domestic law, the TSD chapter includes the 
commitment to keep the level of protection and to effectively enforce the domestic 
law when it affects trade or investment (Council of the European Union 2010, Art. 
13.7). These commitments ensure that lowering standards is not used for 
competitive advantage. However, the requirement that an action needs to affect 
trade or investment is narrowing the scope of the commitment. It allows for a 
lowering of standards as long as it does not affect trade or investment. Proving this 
effect on trade or investment might be very difficult.  
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3. Conceptual framework - the external governance 
approach and its definition of effectiveness 
The External governance approach focuses on the export of rules beyond borders. 
The TSD chapters are portrayed as an example of external governance. The external 
governance framework allows to study how effective the institutional mechanisms 
of the chapters are in contributing to EU’s External Governance on the stage of 
implementation. The following chapter specifies the external governance approach 
and its different levels of rules export, the modes in which rules are governed and 
how the effectiveness of the rule transfer can be assessed. 
The term external governance consists of the notion ‘external’ which refers to 
beyond the borders and the term ‘governance’. Governance is a widely used term 
in political science. Drawing on the definitions developed by Renate Mayntz and 
Fritz W. Scharpf, Tanja Börzel speaks of governance as “institutionalized modes of 
coordination through which collectively binding decisions are adopted and 
implemented” (Börzel 2007, pp. 3–4). According to Börzel, governance is a linkage 
of structures and processes whereas structures such as institutions and actors 
provide the framework for governance processes. This means that governance 
structures can support certain process or modes of coordination (Börzel 2007, 
pp. 3–6). 
Originally applied in the EU context, external governance regards “the expansion 
of EU rules beyond EU borders” (Lavenex, Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 807). The EU 
has exported its rules in various policy areas and in different ways beyond its 
borders. These transactions of rules are the starting point of the external governance 
approach. Authors such as Miriam Oehri have argued that the approach can be 
applied not only to the EU but also to states and other entities. She emphasizes that 
the approach provides a good framework to analyse structures and processes in 
foreign policy-making (Oehri 2015, p. 732). Also Börzel argued that the EU’s 
modes of external governance are not unique to the EU (Börzel 2007). The external 
governance approach can not only explain the EU’s external activities but can be 
applied to other examples as well. The findings in this study might therefore be 
relevant to other examples of external governance and contribute to an even wider 
debate on governance. On a more detailed level, the study can be linked to research 
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on governance of labour or environmental provisions and sheds light on the 
perspective of a governance provider. 
EU governance has been extensively researched. Literature has looked, for 
example, at decision-making structures, negotiation processes and multi-level 
structures behind European governance. However, studying governance inside the 
EU is only one side of the coin. Internal policies often come along with an external 
dimension in which the EU interacts with other countries. Via its external policies, 
the EU transfers rules to third countries. Exporting EU structures to candidate 
countries as part of EU enlargement used to be the main example of external 
governance in the EU context. Interdependencies in a globalised world but also 
external implications of internal policies are other driving forces behind the rule 
expansion (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 793). A good example of an 
implied external dimension is the internal market. By building a common market 
with a custom union, the EU had to develop a common trade policy to the outside. 
This also led to a raising interest in the export of rules. The Commission’s strategy 
‘Trade for All’, reflects the EU’s interest in exporting rules by shaping globalisation 
through bilateral trade agreements (European Commission 2014). Introducing, for 
instance, EU rules on product norms or safety standards in trade agreements might 
contribute to the competitiveness of European producers since they do not have to 
change their products when exporting them outside of the EU.  
In the case of the sustainable development chapters in EU trade agreements, the EU 
is exporting labour and environmental provisions to its trade partners. The aim of 
this paper is not to study the effectiveness of labour and environmental provisions 
but to show how effective the institutional mechanisms established by the TSD 
chapters are in contributing to the implementation of the chapters. In more general 
words, how the institutional structures contribute to the effective export of rules.  
The paper focuses on the contribution at the stage of implementation and only 
touches upon which rules are exported. The external governance framework is 
suitable for this analysis since it does not only cover the set-up of rules in the 
agreement(‘rule selection’) but also the transfer of rules into domestic law (‘rules 
adoption’) and their implementation in actual practices (‘rule application’) (Oehri 
2015, p. 734). Due to the openness of the concept to study the implementation in 
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the partner country, it is suitable for analysing the institutional mechanisms and 
their effectiveness. 
3.1. Three modes of external governance 
Literature on external governance follows the general governance literature and 
identifies three ideal ways how rules are exported. These three modes of governance 
are governance through hierarchy, network and market. In the following section, 
the external dimension of these governance modes is portrayed, however keeping 
in mind that they can also be applied to internal governance. Governance through 
hierarchy implies legally binding rules which are monitored and can be enforced in 
case of non-compliance. Governance through hierarchy is associated with “precise 
rules, formal procedures, monitoring and sanctioning” (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 797). Network governance on the contrary is based on 
cooperation, coordination and interaction. The latter builds on an equal relationship 
whereas governance through hierarchy is associated with more asymmetric power 
relations. Market governance leads to an export of internal market rules based on 
economic interdependencies and competition considerations.  (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, pp. 797–799). The TSD chapters combine hierarchical and 
network-based modes of governments. Miriam Oehri proposes ideal modes of 
hierarchical and network governance especially for labour provisions. Governance 
through hierarchy, in her approach, implies “political and/or judicial” enforcement 
whereas political enforcement occurs in form of “ministerial consultations, 
conciliation and mediation” and judicial enforcement is related to a dispute 
settlement procedure (Oehri 2015, pp. 734–735). Network governance according to 
Oehri includes “co-operative mechanisms [which] can range from dialogue to 
technical assistance projects, joint workshops and studies” and might involve 
various stakeholders (Oehri 2015, p. 735). Schimmelfennig and Lavenex highlight 
the potential of network governance to influence via “socialization, social learning 
and communication” and stress the potential of “deliberative processes, co-
ownership, and density of interaction” to contribute to the rule export (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 798). 
Oehri further emphasises that the use of governance modes can differ from what is 
outlined in the agreements (‘de jure’) to the governance mode in practice (‘de 
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facto’) (Oehri 2015, p. 732). She shows that U.S. and EU trade agreements with 
Mexico and Morocco include hierarchical and network-based governance, however 
both states the facto hardly use governance trough hierarchy but rely to a large 
extend on network-based governance. In this paper the emphasis lies on the ‘de 
facto’ governance and only touches upon the provisions in the agreement. 
3.2. Effectiveness of external governance 
The definition of effectiveness is crucial to the outcome of the later analysis. In the 
context of external governance, effectiveness has been defined “as the extent to 
which EU rules are effectively transferred to third countries” (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 800). The major shortcoming of this definition is that it 
uses the term ‘effectively’ to define effectiveness. However, Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig provide a more convincing and precise definition when they 
differentiate between three levels for measuring the effective transfer of EU or joint 
rules. First, the degree of EU or joint rules in the agreement in comparison to 
international or third country rules indicates effectiveness on the level of rule 
selection. Second, the success of rule adoption can be traced by the number of EU 
or joint rules present in the law of the third country. Third and most relevant in this 
paper, the effective rule application can be measured by looking “[w]hether and to 
what extent EU or joint rules are not only incorporated into domestic legislation but 
also acted upon in political and administrative practice” (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 801). The term of ‘joint rules’ indicates that EU rules are 
often part of international norms as for instance the ILO core labour standards 
(Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 800). The inclusion of joint or international 
rules is often related to network-based External Governance (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 799). Joint rules are part of the analysis since TSD 
chapters are an EU initiative and the international rules overlap with EU rules and 
are promoted in EU policies. 
In this paper effectiveness is defined in the following way: The institutional 
mechanisms are effective when they contributed to a more consistent application of 
the TSD chapter. The definition of a consistent application is based on the 
commitments in the agreement and is identified for every issue in the analysis.  
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It is important to remember that this study does not measure the effectiveness of 
labour and environmental standards in the agreement but aims to assess the 
effectiveness of the institutional mechanisms monitoring the implementation.  
In order to assess the degree of effectiveness of the institutional mechanisms, this 
paper creates ideal types of possible outcomes and places them on a continuum. 
The ideal types are based on a model of Jan Orbie, Deborah Martens and Lore Van 
den Putte which outlined the following degrees of responsiveness for the reaction 
of government officials to civil society organizations (CSOs): “government 
officials can (i) make a statement without listening to the CSOs (one-way 
communication, no responsiveness), (ii) listen to civil society and vice versa (two-
way communication, low responsiveness), (iii) take the input of civil society into 
account (high responsiveness), and (iv) implement the advice by the mechanism in 
concrete policy (full responsiveness)” (Orbie et al. 2016b, p. 24). 
Slightly modified to this paper’s definition of effectiveness and extended beyond 
civil society, effectiveness can be indicated the following way:  
i. no dialogue on an issue (no effectiveness)  
ii. dialogue on an issue (low effectiveness) 
iii. cooperation on an issue (high effectiveness)  
iv. concrete steps or action on an issue (full effectiveness) 
In the first case an issue might have been raised by civil society or in the 
intergovernmental meeting but was not followed up in discussions. If there was 
discussion as for example information exchange but there was no concrete 
cooperation on the issue, it indicates low effectiveness. Cooperation in form of 
projects or studies indicates high effectiveness. Full effectiveness is achieved when 
the mechanism led to concrete steps and action on an issue. It has to be kept in mind 
that this differentiation is only indicative and does not represent a comparable 
measurement. Differentiation are further possible between different degrees of 
dialogue, cooperation and action. However, the model is suitable to give a first 
indication of the degree of effectiveness. 
It is important to note that it cannot be assumed that the institutional mechanisms 
were the only factor that contributed to a more consistent application of the 
chapters. External pressure from outside of the institutional mechanisms can foster 
the implementation Other trade agreements, for instance with the U.S., include 
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similar provisions on labour or environment. A triggering of the dispute settlement 
process foreseen in the KORUS (Korea-U.S.) agreement, might, for instance, 
influence the implementation of similar provisions. Another factor could be the 
work of the ILO which issues reports and visits on the implementation of the ILO 
conventions. Public or external pressure arising due to these reports or visits could 
lead to a better application of the labour provisions in the TSD chapter. The external 
governance literature suggests that factors such as existing institutionalization, 
power structures and domestic structures might promote or constrain the 
effectiveness of external governance (Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009, p. 854; 
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). 
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4. Methodology – Process tracing, case selection and 
material 
To identify how effective the TSD mechanisms are in contributing to a consistent 
application of the TSD chapters, process tracing is applied as a method. In the 
following the method of process tracing is described, reasons are given for choosing 
the method, different kinds of process tracing are explained, limitations of the 
method are highlighted and it is described how process tracing can be conducted. 
Furthermore, the case selection of the EU-Korea agreements is motivated and the 
data for the analysis is presented. 
4.1. Process tracing as a method 
Process tracing is understood as “an analytical tool for drawing descriptive and 
causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence” (David Collier 2011, p. 824). 
The method is building on an analysis of a change and the causalities behind this 
change. In this paper, process tracing helps to understand how institutional 
mechanisms contributed to the implementation and allows to assess the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms. Process tracing implies “searching for evidence 
[…] about the decisional process by which the outcome was produced” (King et al. 
1994, p. 227). The outcome is defined in this case as a consistent application of the 
TSD chapter. The paper studies evidence on the process from an issue being raised 
by civil society or officials in the intergovernmental committee to a better 
implementation of the TSD chapter. If the TSD mechanisms were able to contribute 
to a consistent application of the chapters, they can be seen as an effective 
mechanisms of EU external governance. 
Due to the limited research conducted on TSD mechanisms, an in-depth study with 
process tracing is especially beneficial. It helps to identify the mechanisms which 
lead to a more consistent application of the chapter and allows to access the 
effectiveness of their contributions. The steps leading to an effective contribution 
cannot be captured by a study of many cases since the factors and mechanisms are 
not well enough researched. A large n-study depends on good knowledge of the 
independent variables and is therefore more beneficial when an in-depth study has 
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identified the mechanisms and factors at work beforehand.  In addition, process 
tracing can uncover unknown causal mechanisms and might show that the 
committees contribute in yet not discovered ways. Causal mechanisms are hereby 
defined as “a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a 
number of parts”. (Beach, Pedersen 2011, p. 4). The understanding of causal 
mechanisms as a system means to not only look at which factors have caused an 
outcome but also to look at how those factors are linked (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 
pp. 36–39). Single case studies have been criticised for being of little use to theory 
development due to the limited amount of observations. Critics have called for an 
increase of observations in single case studies and suggested process tracing as a 
mean to increase the number of observations (King et al. 1994, p. 227). However, 
process tracing is more than just producing a high number of observations. It is also 
necessary to link the observations plausibly. Other authors, most prominently 
George and Bennett, have defended single case studies. They agree that process 
tracing can provide a useful method for theory developing and testing (George and 
Bennett 2005, p. 207).  
Beach and Pedersen differentiate between three different kind of process tracing 
namely theory-testing, theory-development and explanations of historical cases 
(Beach and Pedersen 2011, pp. 2–3). Theory-testing as the names implies tests 
whether the causal mechanisms suggested by a theory can be found in a case. Beach 
and Pedersen highlight the difference between theory-testing and -development as 
testing requires “theory before fact” and is based on “fact before theory” (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013, p. 16). Since theory on the contribution of the TSD committees 
to the implementation of the chapter is underdeveloped, this paper is adding mainly 
in the area of theory development.  By looking at the evidence theories on the causal 
mechanisms at work can be developed. George and Bennett highlight, for instance, 
the special ability of process tracing to take account of alternative explanations and 
to identify non-discovered variables (George and Bennett 2005, p. 215). The third 
option aims at explaining a historical case and its outcome (Beach and Pedersen 
2011, pp. 2–3). This option focuses on the specific mechanisms in one case and 
does not necessarily produces generalisable findings (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 
pp. 18–21). 
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However, they also acknowledge problems related to requiring detailed information 
and  the lack of access to key information in the process. (George and Bennett 2005, 
p. 221). In the following case study of Korea, the lack of information is a problem 
to an extent. Especially information on the work of the governmental bodies is 
difficult to access. The paper tries to overcome this limit by conducting interviews 
with participants of the bodies. Further limits to the approach include the need to 
show the process as “an uninterrupted causal path” and the existence of other 
explanations to the same chain of evidence (George and Bennett 2005, p. 222). 
These limits are overcome by a rich amount of information consisting of interviews 
with relevant actors, publications and statements of the committees and secondary 
literature. However, it is not possible in this study to eliminate all other explanations 
which might have led to a more consistent application of the TSD chapters. Taking 
into account the limits, process tracing still represents the most suitable approach 
since it allows to capture the causal mechanisms and variables behind the outcome 
which, for instance, large-n studies would possibly overlook.  
As Collier outlines process tracing allows to look at the development of a process 
over time and includes pinpointing key steps in the process (David Collier 2011, 
p. 824). There are different ways of how process tracing can be conducted. George 
and Bennett outline different forms of process tracing which include the use of 
narratives, hypotheses, analytical and more general explanations (George and 
Bennett 2005, pp. 210–212). In this thesis, a narrative/story with a timeline of the 
observations is used to show how issues raised in the DAGs and the TSD committee 
were followed up. Key steps in the story are highlighted and hypotheses on the 
causal mechanism at place are tested. Collier suggests beginning the process tracing 
by looking at the story and generate hypotheses on the causalities. The hypotheses 
can then be tested by one of these four tests: Straw-in-the-Wind, Hoop, Smoking-
Gun, and Doubly Decisive test. The Straw-in-the-Wind test reveals a tendency of 
whether a hypothesis is more or less likely to be true. It is not possible to eliminate 
or approve a hypothesis based on this test but many Straw-in-the-Wind tests which 
show the same tendency can be an important indicator. The Hoop test requires a 
hypothesis to ‘jump through the hoop’. Even if the hypothesis is able to fit the 
criteria to pass the hoop, alternative explanations can be still possible. Nevertheless, 
it allows to eliminate certain hypotheses which do not pass the hoop. The Smoking 
Gun test builds on the idea that someone holding a smoking gun is very likely to 
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have just fired it. However, other explanations are still possible. The Doubly 
Decisive test is the strongest among the four tests. It is a combination of different 
tests which lead to the confirmation of one hypotheses by falsification of all other 
explanations. The challenge is to identify all possible explanations. (David Collier 
2011, pp. 825–829) Background knowledge is key in this case and essential for 
choosing and interpreting the observations in the right way (David Collier 2011, 
p. 825). The following analysis relies therefore on the chapter on TSD chapters.  
4.2. The choice of Korea and the data on the case 
The TSD mechanisms of the EU-Korea agreement was selected for the single case 
study. Other possible options would have been agreement where the institutional 
mechanisms have been already built. The institutional mechanisms have been 
established under the agreements: EU-Korea, EU-Central America and EU-Peru-
Colombia and more recently the agreements with CARIFORUM, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine. Due to the very limited number of meetings hold (often just 
two meetings) with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, these cases do not qualify for 
an analysis due to the lack of data and chance to develop effective mechanisms. The 
CARIFORUM is a special case since the agreements do not include a TSD chapter 
but an article containing similar sustainable development provisions. Also, the 
establishing of committees is not obligatory but has happened in practice. The EU-
Korea agreement provides the most suitable case since it was the first agreement 
with a TSD chapter and served as a blueprint for the following agreements. 
To capture the causal mechanisms and processes leading to an effective 
contribution of the committees, a single case study was chosen. It gives the 
opportunity to discover how the mechanisms work in practice and how effective 
their contribution is. Since the TSD chapters have been criticised as “window 
dressing” or “talking shops”, it is also from political relevance to show how 
effective their mechanisms have been and what factors constrained their 
effectiveness (Orbie et al. 2016b, p. 46). A large-N study might miss out certain 
causal mechanisms and is of more value as soon as the committees have been 
researched more extensively. 
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The material for the process tracing consists of reports, official statements by the 
committees and representatives and interviews with participants in the institutional 
mechanisms. Appendixes one and two portray the main interview questions asked 
to civil society (appendix one) and to EU officials (appendix two). The interview 
questions were phrased very open in order to get non-biased evidence and to 
uncover unknown evidence. The analysis relies to a large extent on official 
documents of the European side and interviews were conducted with EU officials 
and EU civil society. This choice of mainly European material has been made 
deliberately, since the TSD chapters and its institutional mechanisms are an EU 
initiative and the EU side is the main driving force behind the mechanisms. In this 
way, an assessment of the effectiveness of the institutional mechanisms is more 
fruitful than relying on Korean material which might be based on a different 
understanding of the purpose of the chapters. In addition, there is more material 
accessible in the EU, not only due to language barriers. The EU had a special 
interest in monitoring the Korean TSD chapter closely, since it was used as a 
blueprint for following trade agreements and could be also viewed as a test case of 
the TSD chapters. A limitation is that the paper does not look at every single DAG 
meeting. The agenda of the EU DAG is published. However, meeting minutes of 
the DAG meetings are not available. Therefore, it is not possible to reconstruct the 
DAG meetings. This is not a strong limitation since the DAGs discuss the main 
topics at the civil society forum.  
The official documents published on the webpages of EU institutions include 
statements of the intergovernmental committee, the EU DAG, the civil society 
forum, annual reports on the implementation of the trade agreement and a progress 
report on the implementation. After the meetings of the intergovernmental 
committee a joint statement on the meetings outcomes is presented to the civil 
society forum and published online. The civil society forum publishes conclusions 
on their meetings which are usually presented to the intergovernmental committee. 
The EU DAG has so far published four opinions on the issues of green growth, 
labour rights, emission trading system and corporate social responsibility. 
Furthermore, the EU DAG wrote two letters to the trade commissioner asking for a 
government consultation on labour issues. DG Trade publishes annually a report on 
the implementation of the whole agreement which includes a sub-section on the 
TSD chapter. In addition, an inception and interim report was published evaluating 
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the implementation of the whole agreement in 2017. Reports of joint projects, 
workshops and dialogue with EU civil society are regarded as well. Analysing only 
the meeting summaries and reports risks to miss out at important evidence that was 
not mentioned and sheds only light on the official version of events. Therefore, the 
analysis was supported by interviews. 
The interviews were partly conducted in person in Brussels and via phone. From 
DG Trade three officials were interviewed, from which one representative agreed 
to be cited in this paper. Furthermore, four members of the EU DAG were 
interviewed covering two labour representatives, one business representative and 
one representative of the third group consisting of diverse interest sub-groups and 
NGOs. The identity of the interviewees is kept anonymous. 
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5. Analysis – applying process tracing 
As outlined in the previous chapter on process tracing, the analysis is going to start 
with describing how issues raised in the meetings were followed up. Hypotheses on 
the causal mechanisms at place are generated. Since the TSD mechanisms cover a 
variety of issue, the analysis is divided by main issues which each represent a sub-
case and are traced starting with the first time they have been raised in a meeting. 
Based on the conclusions and statements of the intergovernmental and civil society 
meetings, the following issues are identified as having been raised in the meetings. 
These subcases represent labour, environmental and cross-cutting issues in order to 
achieve a broad coverage and best assessment of the institutional mechanisms. 
5.1. Analysis on the labour provisions 
In the area of labour provisions, the non-ratification of ILO conventions 87 & 98 
on freedom of association and collective bargaining and ILO conventions 29 & 105 
on forced labour and abolition of forced labour are assessed together. The other 
labour topic is the implementation of ILO convention 111 on discrimination in 
employment and occupation. The environmental issues are emission trading 
schemes, illegal logging and circular economy. Corporate social responsibility 
represents the cross-cutting issues which can cover both labour and environmental 
issues. 
5.1.1. The non-ratification of four fundamental ILO conventions 
On labour standards, an often-raised issue is the non-ratification of fundamental 
ILO conventions. As has been outlined in the chapter on the TSD chapter, the 
ratification is an essential commitment. The non-ratification of the following 
conventions has been addressed frequently in the meetings: ILO 87 & 98 Freedom 
of Association and Collective Bargaining and ILO 29 & 105 Forced Labour and 
Abolition of Forced Labour. Since the four conventions are often addressed 
together, the process tracing is conducted together as well. The following process 
tracing aims at answering the sub-question, how effective the institutional 
mechanisms are in contributing to the ratification of the fundamental ILO 
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conventions 29, 87, 98 and 105 by Korea. A consistent application is achieved when 
the conventions are ratified and effectively implemented by Korea. Ratification is 
seen as a first step towards a consistent application. 
The non-ratification of fundamental ILO conventions by Korea was raised in the 
first intergovernmental meeting and in the civil society meeting in 2012. In the 
intergovernmental meeting, Korean and EU officials agreed to exchange 
information and work towards the ratification of the fundamental conventions. They 
further asked the DAGs during the first civil society forum to advice on the issue 
with an opinion on fundamental rights at work (TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 
2012, p. 2). In the civil society forum, the members of the DAGs agreed to prepare 
advice for the next meeting and planned to organize a seminar. Furthermore, they 
discussed ratification and implementation of fundamental ILO conventions and 
agreed that “there were still some problems regarding compliance with international 
standards in Korea” (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2012, p. 1). It is assumed that 
the raising of the non-ratification of the four fundamental conventions as a topic in 
the first intergovernmental meeting started the chain of events by paving the way 
for a future discussion and cooperation on the issue (H1). Indications are that Korea 
agreed to exchange information and to work on the issue. Furthermore, the request 
for advice to the DAGs indicates the intention to continue dialogue on the issue. 
These ‘straws in the wind’ show the same tendency. However, it has to be taken 
into account that the first intergovernmental meeting was also concerned to a large 
extend with setting up the details of the mechanisms (European Commission 
25.02.2013, p. 8; Putte van den 2015, p. 228). 
In the second intergovernmental meeting the EU and Korea committed to work on 
the ratification and to continue the information exchange. The EU side suggested 
to Korea to cooperate with the ILO whereon Korean officials answered that they 
were already cooperating with the ILO. Korea further informed about a discussion 
at its national assembly on the ratification of fundamental conventions (TSDC 
under the Korea-EU FTA 2013, pp. 2–4). A joint seminar was held by the DAGs 
ahead of the next civil society forum in 2013 and addressed especially issues 
regarding forced labour, freedom of association and collective bargaining. The civil 
society forum suggested to organize similar workshops in the future (CSF under the 
EU-Korea FTA 2013b, p. 1). The civil society forum itself discussed especially the 
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opinion on ‘Fundamental Rights at work in the Republic of Korea, identification of 
areas for action’ issued by the EU DAG. The opinion stressed that Korea still had 
not ratified the four fundamental conventions and pointed at the lack of efforts 
towards the ratification. It called for “urgent steps to ratify and effectively 
implement” the remaining conventions (EU DAG under the EU-Korea FTA 
29.05.2013, p. 15). By referring to the ILO, the opinion outlined areas where the 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are restricted by 
legislation and practices in Korea. It recommended changes in the legislation on 
freedom of association, such as excluding peaceful industrial action from the 
application of criminal law and requested solving freedom of association cases 
raised by the ILO. Regarding forced labour, the opinion criticised the Korean anti-
trafficking law (EU DAG under the EU-Korea FTA 29.05.2013). In total, the 
opinion touched upon issues which had been raised by the ILO. As a result of the 
discussion of the opinion, the civil society forum asked “the Korean government to 
take the necessary measures and remove hindrances to enable the ratification of the 
remaining ILO Fundamental Conventions” (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2013b, 
p. 2). In addition, the civil society forum stressed the importance of social dialogue 
and cooperation with the ILO in its conclusion. 
The evidence supports the hypothesis that the institutional mechanisms have led to 
continued dialogue on the outstanding ratification (H2). The exchange of 
information and the commitment to continue the information exchange and work 
towards the ratification support this assumption. The discussion at the Korean 
national assembly indicates that it also led to dialogue on the issues in Korea (H3). 
The civil society forum and its opinion on labour rights might have had a pressuring 
effect by pointing out shortcomings in the implementation and thereby led to further 
dialogue. The discussion of the opinion at the civil society forum and the joint DAG 
seminar on the non-ratified fundamental conventions, showed that the civil society 
forum has given considerable attention to the issue. 
In a special letter to the EU commissioner Karel De Gucht in the beginning of 2014, 
the EU DAG stressed that the Korean government had not acted upon the 
recommendations of the civil society forum and that Korea was breaching Art. 
13.4.3 namely its commitments towards the fundamental rights at work. By 
pointing at three main labour rights violations, the letter requested the Commission 
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to start the formal consultation procedure of the TSD chapter on these issues. The 
violations regarded the freedom of association and right to collective bargaining in 
the cases of the Korean Government Employee’s Union, the Korean Teachers and 
Educators Union and the Korean Railway Workers. The letter further criticised a 
police operation at headquarter of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (EU 
DAG under the EU-Korea FTA 2014b). 
During the third intergovernmental meeting, the fundamental ILO conventions 
were discussed and the discussion was supported by a presentation of the ILO. 
Korea stated that it would keep up the dialogue with the ILO and work towards 
ratifying more conventions. Korea further committed to outline progress and future 
plans for the ratification of the four fundamental conventions in a ‘text’ which 
would be presented to the civil society forum as well (TSDC under the Korea-EU 
FTA 2014). The third civil society forum discussed the ratification of the 
fundamental conventions as well with the ILO. The EU DAG and the labour section 
of the Korean DAG asked to set out a timeline for the ratification and to make use 
of the ILO expertise. Furthermore, the DAGs requested to contribute to the ‘text’ 
(CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2014). 
Based on the observations it is assumed that the institutional mechanisms led to 
continued dialogue within the mechanism as well as with the ILO (H4). Even 
though the Commission did not follow the EU DAGs request to initiate formal 
consultation, the matter was further discussed on an informal level (EU official 
18.04.2018; Industry representative 11.04.2018) and in the intergovernmental 
meeting. Furthermore, the commitment to present a ‘text’ outlining steps towards 
the ratification in the next intergovernmental meeting, indicates that the issue is 
going to be followed up further. The presence of an ILO representative at the 
meetings provided an opportunity for information exchange and dialogue with the 
ILO. 
The ratification of the remaining four fundamental conventions was a topic in the 
fourth intergovernmental meeting. “The EU invited Korea to speed up efforts to 
ratify the fundamental ILO conventions that it hasn't yet ratified” (TSDC under the 
Korea-EU FTA 2015, p. 2). The Korean government explained that they were 
assessing the conformity of their domestic law with the ILO conventions. They 
stated which conventions they are “seriously considering” to ratify due to their high 
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similarity with domestic law (TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2015, p. 2). None of 
the fundamental conventions was among them. However, they emphasized changes 
in the Trade Union and Labour Adjustment Act which was based on ILO 
recommendations. As in the previous meeting, Korea committed to present “texts 
setting out additional intended concrete steps towards removing remaining 
obstacles for ratification of the core ILO Conventions” (TSDC under the Korea-EU 
FTA 2015, p. 3). The fourth civil society forum was not satisfied with the text 
presented and criticised “the lack of progress and concrete steps in particular 
regarding ratification and effective implementation of the ILO fundamental 
conventions” (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2015, p. 2). As in previous meetings 
the civil society forum emphasized in their conclusions the importance of social 
dialogue and further suggest to Korea to have social dialogue on legal and 
administrative deficits. With the ILO the civil society forum discussed obstacles to 
the ratification of the fundamental conventions and recommended to Korea the use 
of ILO technical expertise (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2015).  
In a second letter to trade commissioner Malmström, the EU DAG repeated its 
request for a government consultation since the issues raised in the first letter had 
not been resolved. The letter referred to reports on labour violations issued by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association and the UN 
Working Group on Business and Human Rights (EU DAG under the EU-Korea 
FTA 2016b). 
Based on the presented evidence it is assumed that the institutional mechanism led 
to dialogue and small steps towards the ratification on the Korean side (H5). The 
assessment by Korea of the conformity of its domestic law with the ILO 
conventions is an indicator that they took the issue into account and might take steps 
towards the ratification. The changes of domestic labour law based on ILO 
recommendations indicate that the institutional mechanism may have led to actions 
on the Korean side. Furthermore, that Korea has again committed to provide ‘text’ 
with concrete steps supports the hypothesis. However, the civil society forum 
claimed in its statement that the text which was presented so far did not line out 
concrete steps. This was acknowledged as well in the interview with an EU official 
(EU official 18.04.2018). This line of argumentation is further supported by the 
explicit call of the EU side to speed up efforts towards the ratification and the 
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criticism from the civil society forum that there is a lack of progress and concrete 
steps. 
In the fifth civil society forum the members stressed deficits in the implementation 
of fundamental conventions in the EU especially regarding the freedom of 
association and right to collective bargaining and highlighted that the commitment 
to ratify the four ILO fundamental conventions had still not been fulfilled by Korea. 
The forum further pointed out that Korea had not shared any texts ahead of the 
meeting as was agreed and repeated its wish to involve the DAGs in the creation of 
the text and its advice to make use of ILO technical expertise. It further stated that 
trade union activities should not entail arrests (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 
2017). During the fifth intergovernmental meeting EU officials emphasized the 
relevance of making progress on labour issues which were a serious concern of 
European stakeholder, member states and European institutions. Korean officials 
emphasized that the ratification of ILO conventions “depended on examining the 
need to amend existing legislation, the democratic process and tripartite dialogue, 
as well as the social context” (TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2017, pp. 2–3). 
Korea did not present concrete steps to ratify the conventions on freedom of 
association and collective bargaining. The officials explained the origins of the 
restrictive law towards unions and the application of criminal law against trade 
unions whereby the EU officials stated the need for further dialogue on these issues. 
On the two fundamental conventions on forced labour, Korea stated that 
conversation have been hold with the ministries and the ILO and that a consensus 
for the ratification could be established to ratify in two to three years (TSDC under 
the Korea-EU FTA 2017; European Commission 02.05.2018). 
The European Parliament called in a resolution on the implementation of the EU-
Korea FTA for triggering the formal consultation procedure due to limited progress 
and continuous violations of the freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining in Korea (European Parliament 18.05.2017). 
The evidence presented suggests that the institutional mechanisms have led to 
dialogue but not to concrete steps towards the ratification (H6). This assumption is 
supported by the evidence that Korea did not share any text on concrete steps 
towards ratification and stressed that the ratification depends on many different 
factors. Other indicators are that the European Parliament resolution highlighted the 
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limited progress made and EU officials emphasized in the statement the importance 
of making progress on labour standards. The fact that Korea had conversations with 
relevant ministries and the ILO on the ratification of the conventions on forced 
labour and stated that a ratification might be possible in the next two to three years, 
indicates that the mechanisms led to dialogue in Korea and with the ILO and might 
have lead to concrete steps towards ratification in the case of the forced labour 
conventions. 
Important to note for the sixth civil society meeting, is “that the CSF could not agree 
on common conclusions due to the differences in opinion on guaranteeing and 
promoting freedom of association” and therefore published a joint statement of the 
chairs of the EU and the Korean DAG (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2018, p. 4). 
In the statement the two DAG chairs repeated the ratification request for the 
fundamental conventions. Especially emphasized is the statement of the last 
meeting that trade union activities should not lead to arrests. The statement made 
references to international bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council and the 
ILO which had pointed at violations of the freedom of association in Korea. The 
interviewed labour representatives highlighted that there was a big dispute between 
trade union representatives and employer representatives. The labour 
representatives wanted to refer to major freedom of association cases in Korea but 
could not agree with some of the employer representatives on mentioning the issue 
in the opinion. This led to the publication of a joint statements of the DAG chairs 
instead of an opinion by the whole forum (Labour Representative 1 17.04.2018; 
Labour Representative 2 20.04.2018). 
There was no statement available for the sixth intergovernmental meeting at the 
time of writing. The interviewed EU official highlighted that in the meeting the 
Commission focused on the ratification of the fundamental conventions and put 
pressure on Korea. According to the interviewee, Korea was pressured to present 
concrete steps towards the ratification. Ahead of the meeting the Commission had 
sent concrete questions to the Korean officials and requested written replies to them. 
However, at the meeting Korea did not present and were not prepared to answer the 
questions. In general, it was highlighted that the Korean officials were taking a 
defensive position on labour issues. The interviewee highlighted further that the 
Korean officials had not understood the gravity of the situation and that the 
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commission expects them to present a concrete plan (EU official 18.04.2018). One 
of the labour representative stated that Korea did not expect that they actually have 
to ratify the conventions and that it lacked the political will (Labour Representative 
1 17.04.2018). Another aspect emphasized in the interviews was the factor of the 
new government in Korea. The interviewed industry representative pointed out that 
the Commission is waiting for the new government to start working. Since the new 
president had announced to address some of the labour issue, it has to be seen what 
policies follow the announcement (Industry representative 11.04.2018). This was 
confirmed by the interviewed Commission representative which said that they had 
decided to give some time to the new government (EU official 18.04.2018). 
The evidence supports the previous hypothesis (H6) that the institutional 
mechanisms led to dialogue on the issue but did not lead to concrete steps. Evidence 
supporting this assumption are that the Korean officials did not present a plan how 
they will work towards the ratification and that the EU side continued to put more 
pressure. The recent election and change of government is an intervening factor 
which could have slowed down the process due to the time it takes to set-up the 
government but could also contribute since the new government was regarded as 
more open towards labour issues. The dispute in the civil society forum is another 
intervening factor which might decrease the ability of the forum to pressure and 
pinpoint shortcomings. 
In total, the process tracing on the non-ratified conventions has shown that the 
institutional mechanism led to intergovernmental and social dialogue as well as 
dialogue with the ILO. Even though commitments to work towards the ratification 
were stated by Korea, the process tracing did not reveal cooperation and any 
concrete steps towards the ratification.  
5.1.2. The implementation of the convention 111 on discrimination 
The convention ILO 111 on discrimination (Employment and Occupation) has been 
ratified by Korea, however concerns were raised towards the implementation of the 
convention. The following process tracing aims at answering the sub-question, how 
effective the institutional mechanisms are in contributing to the implementation of 
the convention 111 by Korea. In terms of the definition of effectiveness, a consistent 
application of the chapter is given when the convention is implemented. 
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In the first intergovernmental meeting, the EU and Korea encouraged the DAGs to 
give advice on the implementation of fundamental conventions and Korea informed 
about the conventions it had ratified. The ILO 111 convention on discrimination is 
part of the fundamental conventions but was not explicitly mentioned in the report 
on the meeting (TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2012). The Civil society forum 
talked about issues when it comes to the implementation of fundamental 
conventions and pointed at problems. Furthermore, a seminar was planned ahead 
of the next meeting. 
The EU DAG opinion on fundamental rights at work identified cases of 
discrimination in employment in Korea. The opinion raised areas in which the 
convention is not effectively implemented. It pointed at the discrimination of 
women, irregular workers and migrant workers. The opinion suggested to host an 
international forum on the gender pay gap (EU DAG under the EU-Korea FTA 
29.05.2013).  
It is assumed that raising issues of effective implementation of fundamental ILO 
conventions during the first intergovernmental meeting and in the EU DAG opinion 
promoted future discussions and dialogue on the convention 111 (H1). Indications 
for this hypothesis include that Korea informed about its ratified convention and 
the DAGs were encouraged to give advice. The EU DAG opinion had potentially 
pressured for further dialogue and cooperation by pinpointing problems in regard 
to discrimination. 
The second intergovernmental meeting discussed the ratification of ILO 
fundamental conventions. The EU side recommended to cooperate with the ILO on 
the ratification and implementation and to use ILO technical expertise. Other than 
that no reference was made to the implementation of the convention 111 (TSDC 
under the Korea-EU FTA 2013). The second civil society forum asks both Korean 
and the EU to effectively implement the fundamental conventions they had ratified 
(CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2013b). 
The EU DAG letter called for an effective implementation of all ratified 
conventions but did not specifically refer to convention 111 (EU DAG under the 
EU-Korea FTA 2014b). 
The evidence suggests a slight modification of the first assumption (H1). It is 
assumed that the institutional mechanism did lead to a general dialogue on the 
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effective implementation of ILO fundamental conventions but did not promote an 
in-depth discussion of ILO convention 111 (H2). Clues for this hypothesis are that 
the convention had not been mentioned directly in the second meetings and the EU 
DAG letter. 
In the third intergovernmental meeting the ILO hold a presentation on the 
ratification of ILO conventions and offered as well technical cooperation and advice 
on how to effectively implement the conventions on discrimination (TSDC under 
the Korea-EU FTA 2014). The third civil society forum made general references to 
the fundamental conventions and encouraged Korea to use ILO expertise and to 
promote social dialogue to effectively implement the fundamental conventions 
(CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2014). 
It is assumed that the ILO offer to provide advice and technical assistance on the 
effective implementation of conventions on discrimination led to further dialogue 
on the issue (H3). The evidence does however only include the mentioning of the 
offer in the intergovernmental statement. 
During the fourth intergovernmental meeting the ILO hold a presentation on the 
implementation of the convention 111. Korea and the EU agreed to initiate a project 
under the partnership instrument on the topic. The project meant to show the current 
state of implementation in Korea and the EU and to discuss difficulties, best-
practice and experiences (TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2015). The fourth civil 
society forum welcomed the initiative and showed their interest in participating in 
the project. Similar projects were suggested for other fundamental ILO conventions 
with the inclusion of workers’ and employers’ representatives into the projects 
(CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2015). 
The previous hypothesis that the ILO offer led to further dialogue on convention 
111 (H3) is strengthened by the fact that the topic was discussed in the fourth 
meetings in an ILO presentation and that the EU and Korea agreed to cooperate in 
a partnership project. 
Similar to the first EU DAG letter, the second EU DAG letter pointed at the 
commitment to effectively implement ratified ILO conventions. Discrimination of 
female workers was mentioned in the annex to the letter in a report of the United 
Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights (EU DAG under the EU-
Korea FTA 2016a). 
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The fifth civil society forum criticised that fundamental conventions were not 
effectively implemented in Korea and called for actions especially on issues 
identified by the ILO. Again, the importance of social dialogue for the 
implementation was emphasized. In regard to the project on the convention 111, 
the civil society forum asked to include more Korean stakeholders and hoped for 
independent conclusions (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2017).The project on the 
convention 111 was concluded with a final seminar in March 2017. The study 
examined the implementation of the convention in the EU and in Korea. Workshops 
were organized in Seoul and in Brussels (European Commission 09.11.2017, p. 27). 
During the fifth intergovernmental meeting, the project on the convention was 
evaluated. On the Korean side the project was evaluated as “meaningful and helpful 
in gaining a better understanding of each other’s situation” (European Commission 
02.05.2018, p. 4). The EU side evaluated the project as well as meaningful also in 
paving the way for future cooperation on sensitive topics. Discrimination based on 
gender was identified as a common issue. The EU officials suggested to discuss 
possible follow-ups of the project in the next meeting (TSDC under the Korea-EU 
FTA 2017).  
The co-chairs of the sixth civil society forum called for concrete action to combat 
the gender pay gap. The joint statement criticised that the project on the convention 
did not fulfil ILO standards. 
 It is assumed that the institutional mechanisms led to dialogue and cooperation on 
convention 111 resembled by the launching of a joint project. The explorative 
character of the project is indicated by the EU statement that the project was as well 
meaningful for future cooperation on sensitive topics. Criticism on the side of 
labour representatives describes the project as not so meaningful since the final 
study was ‘watered down’ (Labour Representative 1 17.04.2018). 
To summarize the findings of the process tracing, the outcome showed that the 
institutional mechanisms led to dialogue and cooperation on the convention 111. 
The launching of a joint project investigating the implementation of the convention 
was identified as being the result of interaction and dialogue in the institutional 
mechanisms.  
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5.2. Analysis on the environmental provisions 
The commitments in the TSD chapter on environment are less specific than the 
labour commitments. The definition of effectiveness needs to be adjusted to the 
environmental provisions in the chapter. The provisions regard the effective 
implementation of the multilateral environmental agreements which each side has 
signed so far. The annex outlines areas of cooperation among them climate change 
and illegal logging. Based on the provisions the process tracing aims at answering 
the sub-question how effective the institutional mechanisms are in contributing to 
dialogue and cooperation in the area of emission trading schemes, illegal logging 
and the circular economy. In regard to the definition of effectiveness, a consistent 
application of the provisions is defined as dialogue and cooperation on the issues. 
The three issues are analysed separately starting with emission trading schemes.  
5.2.1. Emission trading schemes 
The future introduction of an emission trading system by Korea was mentioned in 
the first intergovernmental meeting (TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2012). In the 
context of discussing developments in environmental policies, the second 
intergovernmental meeting touched upon initiatives on emission trading schemes 
(TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2013). The civil society forum did not mention 
the issue in its first and second meeting where it made references only generally to 
green growth (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2013b; CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 
2012).  
This evidence suggests that the interaction in the intergovernmental meetings had 
not lead to immediate dialogue but fostered dialogue in the future (H1). Indications 
for this assumption are that the topic was only mentioned in the two 
intergovernmental meetings. The mentioning of Korea’s intention to introduce a 
system might have encouraged future dialogue.  
Ahead of the third meetings the EU DAG released a discussion paper explaining 
the EU’s emission trading scheme. It highlighted the EU’s ambition to promote 
global solutions to climate change such as the UN framework convention on climate 
change (UNFCCC). Due to the Korean plans to launch its own scheme, the 
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discussion paper presented the EU’s emission trading scheme and discussed the 
composition of a well-functioning emission trading scheme. Should the Korean 
scheme work well, it was hoped that other countries would follow the model (EU 
DAG under the EU-Korea FTA 2014a). The interviewed industry representative 
highlighted that the Korean DAG members were interested in learning from the 
European system. Therefore, the focus lay on presentation, peer review and 
exchange of practice (Industry representative 11.04.2018).  
The evidence presented suggests that the interaction in the mechanisms led to the 
presentation of best practice and information by the EU side and promoted further 
cooperation (H2). This assumption is based on the presentational nature of the DAG 
opinion which focuses on the European system. The Korean interest to learn from 
the European system in light of launching a new system supports the assumption 
further. 
During the intergovernmental meeting the European system was presented which 
was highlighted as the “flagship of the EU climate policy” (TSDC under the Korea-
EU FTA 2014, p. 2). Korea outlined involvement in setting up its scheme planned 
for the following year in 2015. In this context cooperation was highlighted as 
important (European Commission 26.03.2015). Until the end of 2015, the EU and 
Korea planned to launch a project on ETS under the partnership instrument to learn 
from the EU’s experience. In general, to talk about future projects on environment 
and labour, the committee agreed to have a meeting of the EU’s delegation in Seoul 
with Korean ministries. The third civil society forum discussed the emission trading 
schemes in both countries and the experience of the European implementation. It 
also welcomed further cooperation on climate change issues also related to emission 
trading schemes (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2014).  
The evidence supports the previous assumption (H2) in so far as the meetings 
included presentations of the EU practice and that it was agreed to launch a project 
on emission trading schemes to learn from the EU example. The assumption can be 
further developed as the evidence suggests that the interaction in the mechanisms 
led to dialogue in form of providing expertise, best practice experience and advice 
by the EU side and to cooperation in a project (H3). 
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Emission trading schemes were not mentioned in the conclusions of both the 
intergovernmental and the civil society fourth meetings in 2015 (CSF under the EU-
Korea FTA 2015; TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2015). 
During the fifth intergovernmental meeting, the ongoing cooperation project was 
discussed and regarded as functioning well. Korea took into account the 
recommendation to involve the Ministry of Industry Trade and Energy into the 
project (TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2017).  
The previous assumption (H3) that the institutional mechanisms led to dialogue and 
cooperation is supported due to the realisation of a project in which the EU supports 
Korea on the implementation of its scheme. 
The fifth and the sixth civil society forum did not mention emission trading in its 
conclusion (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2017; CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 
2018). 
In regard to effectiveness, the process tracing discovered that the institutional 
mechanism led to dialogue and cooperation on the emission trading scheme and can 
therefore be regarded as effective. As in previous examples the process is still 
ongoing and it would need to be assessed in future research how far Korea has taken 
the advice into account when implementing its own system. 
5.2.2. Illegal harvested timber 
Illegal logging of timber (cutting down of trees) was the first time discussed in the 
second intergovernmental meeting where the EU presented its policy on combatting 
illegal logging and suggested to discuss the issue further (TSDC under the Korea-
EU FTA 2013). The civil society fora did not mention the issue directly in any of 
the following meetings.  
The evidence points at that the issue was introduced by the EU side in the 
intergovernmental meeting. It is assumed that the raising of the issue led to further 
dialogue on the issue (H1). This is supported by the evidence that the EU suggested 
to discuss it further in the second intergovernmental statement. However, the 
statement does not mention a contribution on Korean side. This suggests that it 
might not have led to dialogue immediately in the same meeting. 
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The conclusion of the third intergovernmental meeting mentions that information 
was exchanged on the topic (TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2014). This evidence 
supports the previous assumption that the interaction in the intergovernmental 
meeting led to further dialogue (H1). 
During the fourth meeting the EU presented its projects in Asia and suggested to 
cooperate. Korea informed about a proposal which was in process and agreed to 
exchange experience on developments. In the fifth intergovernmental meeting, the 
EU side voiced the wish to cooperate on the issue.   
The evidence on the topic suggests that there has been dialogue on the issue (H1). 
This is indicated by the exchange of information and that the EU side voiced the 
wish to cooperate on the issue.  
To conclude, the evidence presented indicated that the interactions in the 
intergovernmental meeting have led to further dialogue in the next meetings. Even 
though the wish to cooperate was voiced on the EU side and areas of cooperation 
were presented, the evidence suggests that it did not lead to concrete cooperation. 
Therefore, the institutional mechanisms are regarded as having had limited effect. 
As mentioned before, the ongoing process makes final conclusions on the 
effectiveness difficult. The process tracing was based on a small amount of 
evidence in comparison to the other issues. This is due to the small scope of the 
topic and the non-mentioning of the issue in the civil society forum. 
5.2.3. Circular economy 
The circular economy was the first time mentioned in the statement of the third 
intergovernmental meeting whereas the third civil society meeting did not raise the 
issue. In the intergovernmental meeting Korea and the EU talked about their policy 
developments on green growth and the circular economy. In the EU’s presentation, 
the Korean companies were invited to join an initiative on environmental footprints 
and Korea presented their main initiatives which covered also upcycling industries 
the Korean Act on resource circulating society. The EU side suggested to organize 
a forum in Korea on eco-innovations which they agreed to further discuss (TSDC 
under the Korea-EU FTA 2014; CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2014). As suggested 
in the meeting, an eco-innovation forum took place in October 2015 in Seoul. The 
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forum discussed new innovations and their business opportunities as well as 
innovation in circular economy (European Economic and Social Committee 
18.10.2017, p. 12).  
It is assumed that the institutional mechanism led to dialogue and cooperation on 
the circular economy (H1). A strong indicator is that the forum on eco-innovation 
which was proposed by the EU side took place. Another indicator is the presentation 
of initiatives by both sides in the meetings. Since the civil society forum did not 
mention the issue in its meeting, it can be assumed that the intergovernmental 
meeting was the starting point. 
Also in the fourth intergovernmental meeting, the EU and Korea exchanged 
information on their flagship initiatives on recycling and the circular economy 
(TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2015). The fourth civil society forum stated the 
ambition to continue dialogue on climate change and environmental policy and 
wanted to discuss further chemicals and waste management by consulting experts 
in the fields (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2015).  
The exchange of information on flagship initiatives and the intention of the civil 
society forum to continue dialogue presents evidence which supports the first 
assumption (H1) in so far as it suggests that the institutional mechanism did 
contribute to dialogue on the issue. Evidence for further cooperation was however 
not present. 
In the fifth intergovernmental meeting, it was stated that, “both the EU and Korea 
considered that, while there was no formal dialogue on environment, the exchange 
in the CTSD as valuable” (European Commission 02.05.2018, p. 2). In the meeting, 
the EU officials pointed out that the circular economy is a priority and presented 
measures on waste management as part of the EU’s circular economy initiatives. 
The EU officials suggested to cooperate on circular economy and to organize a 
mission on circular economy to Korea. The Korean officials said that they would 
consider this and presented their actions on waste management. They further voiced 
the wish to cooperate further on the circular economy as for example discussing 
political and legislative measures. The fifth civil society forum did not touch upon 
the issue. 
In line with the first assumption (H1), it is assumed that the institutional 
mechanisms led to dialogue and cooperation. The continued exchange of measures 
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on the circular economy and the voiced willingness to cooperate are indicators 
which support this hypothesis. 
The sixth civil society forum recommended that sectors with high emissions should 
make use of the circular economy model (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2018). 
The interviewed business representative highlighted the need for a multi-
stakeholder approach since issues such as chemical waste management are 
implemented by companies and good practice needs to be shared (Industry 
representative 11.04.2018). 
The evidence so far suggests that the institutional mechanisms led to exchange of 
information on the circular economy and to a limited degree to cooperation. The 
proposed cooperation mission has so far not been realised which however might 
happen in the future. 
In total, the process tracing revealed a limited effectiveness of the mechanisms. The 
mechanisms supported the exchange of information about initiatives on circular 
economy. Concrete cooperation was not going beyond the organization of a forum 
in Korea. However, the evidence suggests that the organization of a circular 
economy mission to Korea might be realised in the future. 
5.3. Analysis on the cross-cutting issue of corporate social 
responsibility 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is part of annex 13 which outlines areas of 
cooperation. The annex provides for exchange of information and cooperation on 
CSR. It does however not include concrete commitments. Therefore, the definition 
of effectiveness as a consistent application of the chapter needs to be adjusted. The 
institutional mechanism can be regarded as effective when they contributed to 
dialogue and cooperation on CSR. The process tracing aims at answering the sub-
question how effective the institutional mechanisms are in contributing to dialogue 
and cooperation on CSR. 
CSR was raised as a topic during the first intergovernmental meeting in which the 
EU and Korea discussed possible cooperation on CSR. The EU side proposed to 
cooperate and to create initiatives together. Korea was open for cooperation and 
both sides agreed to discuss the issue further in the next meeting (TSDC under the 
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Korea-EU FTA 2012). CSR was not mentioned in the summary of the first civil 
society meeting (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2012).  
Based on this evidence a causal link between the interaction in the 
intergovernmental committee and future dialogue on the topic is assumed. The 
underlining assumption (H1) is that raising the issue in the first intergovernmental 
meeting by the EU officials led to further dialogue on CSR. This hypothesis is 
supported by the agreement of both sides to discuss the issue further in the next 
meeting. CSR was not a main topic in the civil society forum since it was not 
mentioned in the summary of the meeting. This indicates that the chain of events 
started in the intergovernmental meeting. 
In the second intergovernmental meeting, Korea and the EU presented current 
initiatives. Korea informed about ISO 26000 and the EU about initiatives on UN 
principles for Business and Human Rights and initiatives related to public 
procurement. Possible cooperation in CSR related to labour rights was discussed as 
well. Furthermore, the EU officials suggested to involve the DAGs on the topic 
(TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2013). Again, the civil society forum did not 
mention CSR in its conclusions (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 2013b).  
The evidence supports the first hypothesis as far as dialogue on CSR was continued 
in the second intergovernmental meeting. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that 
the exchange in the intergovernmental meetings encouraged further dialogue and 
cooperation on CSR not only in the intergovernmental meeting but also in the civil 
society forum and the DAGs (H2). Indications which point toward this hypothesis 
are the exchange of information, the intention to involve the DAGs and to 
cooperate. A further weaker indication towards the assumption is that the first two 
civil society fora did not mention CSR in their conclusions. 
Ahead of the third meetings, the EU DAG published an opinion on corporate social 
responsibility. The opinion states the aim to initiate a discussion on corporate social 
responsibility in the civil society forum. It outlines concrete initiatives as well as 
international cooperation by the UN, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) and the ILO. The EU DAG further proposed to study 
the Korean National Contact Point established under the OECD framework and to 
encourage the creation of a national action plan in Korea (EU DAG under the EU-
Korea FTA 2014c).  
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The publication of the EU DAG opinion could be connected to the intention of the 
intergovernmental meeting to involve the DAGs on CSR. The stated aim of the 
opinion to initiate a discussion in the civil society forum together with the not-
mentioning of CSR in the civil society statements so far are hints that support the 
previous assumption (H2). 
The EU DAG opinion was presented to the third intergovernmental meeting. The 
EU and Korea discussed international principles and guidelines on CSR and stated 
the intention to discuss this issue further. The EU officials raised the conduct of 
European and Korean companies and the OECD National Contact Points as areas 
for further discussion and cooperation. Furthermore, the committee suggested to 
the civil society forum to give further advice on CSR (TSDC under the Korea-EU 
FTA 2014). In the third civil society forum, the DAGs gave presentations on current 
CSR practices. The importance of international initiatives was highlighted and 
further cooperation and learning from each other aspired. They agreed to share their 
experiences and lessons learned. The Korean DAG is asked to organize a workshop 
on CSR ahead of the next meeting to exchange best-practices (CSF under the EU-
Korea FTA 2014).  
The evidence outlined suggests that the dialogue in the intergovernmental and civil 
society forum led to further dialogue and cooperation on the issue (H3). This is 
indicated by the voiced intention to discuss, for example, international principles 
and guidelines and the suggestion of further areas of cooperation and discussion by 
the EU side. The intergovernmental committee further encouraged the DAGs to 
advice on CSR and the civil society forum stated its intention for further dialogue 
and cooperation. The exchange of best-practice, international initiatives and 
lessons-learned from own initiatives could lead to actions on CSR.  
Experiences were also exchanged in the fourth intergovernmental meeting such as 
initiatives in Bangladesh. Another topic was the commitments to responsible 
business conduct which was highlighted as a potential area of cooperation. It was 
discussed to start a project on CSR under the partnership instrument. The ambition 
was stated to decide on the project until the next meeting (TSDC under the Korea-
EU FTA 2015). As in previous civil society meetings, the DAGs gave presentations 
on CSR initiatives and agreed to continue exchange of information and best-
practice in the next meeting. The organization of a workshop on CSR ahead of the 
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next meeting was considered. It was suggested to Korean companies to engage into 
an initiative in Bangladesh. As a result of a presentation about the Korean National 
Contact Point under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the civil 
society forum acknowledged the importance of engaging with the National Contact 
Points.  
The consideration of a joint project and the outlining of possible areas of 
cooperation indicate the intention to further cooperate and continue dialogue. This 
evidence supports the previous hypothesis 3. The civil society forum might promote 
cooperation on CSR by providing discussions and exchanging best-practice (H4). 
The fifth civil society forum suggested to launch joint projects on the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and to further discuss these issues. The forum intended 
to strengthen cooperation on CSR, especially on the issues just named and further 
on CSR and the environmental and on the performance of National Contact Points. 
The forum called for actions to respond to tragedies such as the tragedy with 
humidifier sterilizers which had recently happened (CSF under the EU-Korea FTA 
2015). During the fifth intergovernmental meeting the EU presented their own 
initiatives whereas Korea acknowledged that initiatives are mainly in the private 
sector and that there are few government-led initiatives. Korea brought up the 
discussion of the civil society forum on humidifier sterilizers and the diesel 
emission scandal (TSDC under the Korea-EU FTA 2015; European Commission 
02.05.2018).  
The evidence of the fifth meetings does not strengthen hypothesis 4 since there was 
no further intergovernmental cooperation beyond dialogue on the initiatives. Based 
on the evidence so far, it can only be said that the institutional mechanism led to 
dialogue on CSR (H1). This is indicated by the exchange of information on 
initiatives in both the intergovernmental as well as civil society meetings. Even 
though no evidence for concrete cooperation is presented, the voiced intention to 
engage in cooperation might lead to a joint project in the future. 
In the statement of the co-chairs of the sixth civil society forum, CSR is not 
mentioned. The EU official interviewed, pointed at good discussions on CSR in the 
sixth intergovernmental meeting and said that the aim is to have deeper cooperation 
in the future (EU official 18.04.2018). As a business representative from the EU 
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DAG pointed out in the interview, there can be different perspectives on CSR since 
there is no internationally agreed definition and the EU and Korea had rather 
different ideas of it (Industry representative 11.04.2018).  
This evidence supports the previous assumption that the interaction in the 
institutional mechanisms led to dialogue on CSR (H1). The process tracing on CSR 
indicates a limited degree of effectiveness since it uncovered that the interaction in 
the institutional mechanisms led to dialogue on CSR but not to concrete 
cooperation. 
5.4. Discussion of the results 
The process tracing has revealed how effective the institutional mechanisms have 
been so far in contributing to the implementation of the specific TSD provisions. 
This chapter discusses the results. It summarizes the main findings, discusses 
possible explanations for the outcomes and acknowledges limitations. 
Due to the various issues raised during the meetings and in order to achieve a broad 
coverage and best assessment of the institutional mechanisms, the analysis was 
divided into sub-cases which represent labour, environmental and cross-cutting 
issues. The labour provisions represent the most concrete commitments since they 
require the ratification and implementation of ILO fundamental conventions 
namely the conventions 87, 98, 29, 105 & 111 on freedom of association, collective 
bargaining, forced labour and discrimination. The environmental issues in the 
analysis, emission trading schemes, illegal logging and circular economy, are 
covered by the annex 13 of the chapter and aim for cooperation on the issues. 
Similar in this respect is the issue corporate social responsibility which is included 
in annex 13 providing for the exchange of information and cooperation. The 
definition of an effective institutional mechanism as contributing to the consistent 
application of the chapter needs to take into account the different nature of the 
commitments. In case of the environmental issues and corporate social 
responsibility a consistent application means the achievement of cooperation on the 
issues. For labour standards a consistent application is based on the commitment to 
ratify and implement the ILO conventions. 
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In the case of the non-ratified ILO conventions on freedom of association, collective 
bargaining and forced labour, the process tracing has shown that the institutional 
mechanisms contributed to dialogue but not to cooperation and concrete steps 
which suggests that the mechanisms’ effectiveness was limited. The contribution 
was to a degree more effective in the case of the forced labour conventions. This is 
indicated by the Korean statement that ratification might be possible in the next two 
to three years. For the conventions on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, Korea only committed to work towards the ratification but did not make 
a similar statement and did not present concrete steps. For the convention 111 on 
discrimination the institutional mechanism was more effective since it led not only 
to dialogue but also to cooperation in a joint project. However, concerns were raised 
by civil society in regard to the content and execution of the project (Labour 
Representative 1 17.04.2018). 
For environmental issues, the process tracing followed the developments in the area 
of emission trading schemes, illegal logging and circular economy. The institutional 
mechanisms have promoted dialogue and cooperation on emission trading schemes, 
dialogue and limited cooperation on the circular economy and dialogue on illegal 
logging. This means the contribution on emission trading schemes is regarded as 
effective. The evidence on illegal logging showed that the request of the EU side to 
cooperate was not followed up and that the mechanism promoted exchange of 
information and experience. It needs to be considered that illegal logging was not 
mentioned in the statements of the civil society fora. Similar to the case of illegal 
logging, the mechanisms led to the exchange of information about initiatives on 
circular economy. Concrete cooperation was not going beyond the organization of 
a forum in Korea. However, the evidence suggests that the organization of a circular 
economy mission to Korea might be realised in the future.  
In the case of corporate social responsibility, the intention to cooperate was voiced 
and possible areas for cooperation and projects suggested. However, there was no 
evidence for the initiating of concrete steps towards cooperation. It has to be 
acknowledged that it is an ongoing process and assessing effectiveness at this point 
does not take into account future developments. Due to the voiced intention to 
cooperate and the statement of the EU official that the Commission aims for deeper 
cooperation, future developments are possible. 
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The analysis revealed differences when it comes to the possible causes of 
effectiveness. The factors identified provide a base for theory development and 
future research. An interesting aspect is the role of political willingness to address 
an issue and political sensitive issues. The dispute in the last civil society forum and 
the reluctance of the previous Korean government towards labour issues, showed 
the political contestation on labour issues. This hindered dialogue and cooperation 
on the issues in the intergovernmental meetings. It had influenced the ability of the 
civil society bodies to make concrete statements especially on the freedom of 
association and collective bargaining. Emission trading schemes represented almost 
the opposite case. The Korean side showed big interest in receiving advice from the 
European counterparts. The Korean interest to learn from the European emission 
trading system was highlighted in the interviews and was revealed in the meeting 
documents. The nature of the cooperation was focused on Korea learning of the EU 
example. This is a possible explanation for the especially successful interactions on 
emission trading schemes in the institutional mechanisms. This findings resonate to 
some degree with the external governance literature, which suggests that similar 
“domestic rules, tradition and practices” foster the application of rules (Lavenex 
and Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 804).  
Another factor is the degree of civil society engagement which differed depending 
on the issue. Previous research had suggested that a link between the foreseen 
involvement of civil society in the agreement and the effectiveness of the provisions 
exits (Orbie et al. 2017). The findings in this paper support this thesis when it comes 
to the link between the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the engagement of civil 
society. It adds further to previous research by shedding light on the de-facto 
involvement of civil society. On labour issues, the activity of civil society was to a 
large extent based on pinpointing shortcomings in the implementation and to a less 
degree on the exchange of information on practices. This was the opposite for 
emission trading where the European civil society was giving mainly advice how 
the European system functions. The non-mentioning of corporate social 
responsibility in the first two civil society meetings and the explicit suggestion to 
involve the DAGs in the third intergovernmental meeting are indications for the 
limited engagement at the beginning. This factor might explain to some degree the 
limited effectiveness of the mechanisms in the area of corporate social 
responsibility. Illegal logging was not at all mentioned in the statements of the civil 
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society forum. A possible explanation for the non-involvement in this area could be 
that it was not regarded as an important topic by the members of the civil society 
forum. The EU DAG comprises of only one environmental NGO which has not 
been a member right from the beginning. The Korean DAG comprises of professors 
in the environmental segment and does not include environmental NGOs. This 
could be a possible explanation of the little engagement. In total, the findings 
suggest that civil society involvement in the mechanisms depends on various factors 
among them the representativity of civil society organizations in the meetings. 
Another aspect is the role of the civil society mechanisms in providing social 
dialogue. With the large divisions on labour issues in the civil society, social 
dialogue on labour is difficult and the institutional mechanisms provide a forum for 
social dialogue. The effects of providing for social dialogue could not be assessed 
in the scope of this research.  
Another identified factor is the involvement of international organizations. The ILO 
presence in the intergovernmental and civil society meetings as well as the 
suggestions to Korea to work with the ILO contributed to dialogue with the ILO. 
The dialogue can foster the ratification and implementation of conventions by 
providing technical assistance and pinpointing obstacles and solutions. In the case 
of ILO convention 111, the presence of the ILO representative contributed with 
information on the implementation and by offering technical assistance. The ILO 
was the international organizations with the deepest and most frequent involvement 
in the institutional mechanisms. However, the OECD’s national contact point in 
Korea was, for example, invited for a presentation which contributed to a better 
understanding of the OECD initiatives on corporate social responsibility.  
Relating the findings to the external governance approach, an interesting point is 
the request of the EU DAG and the European parliament to change from network 
governance to hierarchical governance by initiating the formal consultation process 
on labour issues. The reluctance of the commission to start the process supports 
previous research which showed that the EU relies de facto mainly on network 
governance when it comes to trade and sustainable development (Oehri 2015). In 
general, it can be said that the de-facto modes of governance were network-based 
and relied on co-operative mechanisms such as exchange of information, 
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experience and best practice, joint studies and suggestion of joining international 
and domestic initiatives. 
The conducted research is constrained by some limitations. It has to be noted that 
the comparability of the findings is limited by the varying degree of commitments 
on the issues, the different timelines of events with some issues having been raised 
in the beginning and others at a later point and different densities in the coverage 
and scope of an issue. Furthermore, the research cannot identify all intervening 
factors which influence the effectiveness. As highlighted earlier, external factors 
such as other trade agreements with similar provision could affect the outcome. 
Also process such as social learning or empowerment of civil society through the 
mechanisms could not be assessed in the scope of this paper. Due to the focus on 
official documents, the paper could have overlooked informal dialogue which was 
not mentioned in the interviews. As pointed out earlier, the analysis did focus on 
main issues addressed during the meetings and disregarded smaller issues as well 
as issues which have not been addressed in the meetings. Finally, the analysis was 
based on an ongoing process which makes a final assessment of effectiveness 
difficult and only allows for preliminary conclusions. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper researched the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms in trade and 
sustainable development (TSD) chapters in EU trade agreements. The institutional 
mechanisms in the TSD chapters consist of three main structures, an 
intergovernmental committee which is overseeing the implementation and is 
advised by two civil society bodies. The structures have the task to contribute to the 
implementation of the labour and environmental provisions in the TSD chapter. For 
the case of the EU-Korea free trade agreement, the blueprint case for TSD chapters, 
this paper process traced the contribution of the institutional mechanisms. By 
assessing the effectiveness of the mechanisms through the lens of the external 
governance framework, this paper found out that the mechanisms’ contribution to 
the implementation and its effectiveness varied across policy issues. Due to the 
different nature of labour, environmental and cross-cutting issues the analysis was 
divided by six topics. The issues covered the ratification of ILO conventions 
(freedom of association, collective bargaining and forced labour), the 
implementation of ILO convention 111 on discrimination, emission trading 
schemes, illegal logging, circular economy and corporate social responsibility. 
Differences were found across and within policy areas. The analysis further 
revealed possible factors for the differences which provide promising areas for 
theory development and future research. 
The analysis uncovered that, when it comes to the ratification of conventions, the 
effectiveness was rather limited. The chapter includes the commitments to ratify 
and implement the eight ILO fundamental conventions. The ratification of ILO 
fundamental conventions was raised frequently in the institutional mechanisms, but 
the outcome did not reach beyond initiating dialogue on the issue. The mechanisms 
were more effective and led to cooperation on the implementation of the ILO 
convention 111 on discrimination. The convention has been ratified by Korea, but 
concerns have been raised on the implementation. The institutional mechanisms led 
to dialogue and to cooperation in a joint study about the state of the implementation 
in Korea and the EU.  
The environmental issues and the cross-cutting issue of corporate social 
responsibility are covered by the annex 13 of the TSD chapter and aim for 
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information exchange and cooperation on the issues. In this respect, the 
commitments are less concrete in comparison to the labour provisions. For these 
issues, the contribution of the institutional mechanisms was regarded as effective 
when it led to cooperation. This was the case for emission trading schemes. A 
possible factor which might have fostered the contribution of the mechanisms was 
the strong Korean interest to learn from the European system for emission trading. 
In the case of illegal logging the mechanisms led to dialogue but the EU side request 
to cooperate was not taken up. The mechanisms contributed further to dialogue and 
limited cooperation on circular economy. The intention to cooperate on corporate 
social responsibility was raised but has not been followed up. Since the institutional 
mechanisms contributed by initiating dialogue on illegal logging and circular 
economy, but no cooperation they can be regarded as effective to a limited degree 
on these issues.  
It has to be considered that it is still an ongoing process and the assessment of 
effectiveness is not a final result. Furthermore, the issues raised had different 
timelines and degrees of commitments which makes it difficult to compare the 
effectiveness across issues. 
The differences in the functioning of the institutional mechanisms calls into 
question the EU’s approach of having one blueprint model of the institutional 
mechanisms in its trade agreements. It further emphasizes that the academic debate 
needs to focus more on the stage of implementation of agreements and consider the 
effects of institutional mechanisms, the variations in its functioning and the causes 
of the variations.  
The process tracing revealed possible intervening factors which might explain the 
outcome and offer interesting areas for future research. A possible factor is the 
political sensitivity of an issues as for example the high sensitivity of labour issues 
in Korea. The divide between trade unions and employers was especially visible 
during the last civil society meeting in April 2018. The forum could not agree on a 
joint conclusion due to a dispute on mentioning freedom of association cases in its 
meeting conclusion. Political willingness was raised as a possible variable in the 
conducted interviews. The interviewees pointed at the impact of national elections 
and the government’s attitude towards issues. This might point at the relevance of 
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domestic politics in the partner countries. Future research should take political 
willingness and sensitivity of issues into account as an intervening variable. 
The process tracing further revealed differences when it comes to the engagement 
of civil society. For some issues, civil society was mainly pinpointing shortcomings 
in the implementation, whereas in other cases it was mostly providing information 
and advice on initiatives. In addition, there was a high variation in the level of civil 
society engagement. Whereas labour issues have been discussed frequently in the 
meetings other issues have been just addressed after a request of the 
intergovernmental committee or not at all as in the case of illegal logging. Further 
research could explore the link between civil society engagement and the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms in more detail and investigate, for instance, the 
relevance of interest representation in the DAGs. 
Another interesting aspect in regard to the external governance approach were the 
requests by civil society and the European Parliament to change the modes of 
governance from network to hierarchical governance and the reluctance of the 
commission to do so. This observation was in line with previous research which 
showed that the EU tends to rely mainly on network-based governance (Oehri 
2015). In this context it would be interesting to compare the de-facto use of 
network-based and hierarchical governance across chapters in trade agreements.  
An area for future research is the question to which extent the interactions on 
corporate social responsibility have led to a more similar understanding of the issue. 
The presence of different perspectives on CSR and the absence of an international 
definition were highlighted by an interviewee. This could be researched in the 
bigger context of EU TSD chapters and their impact on the understanding of CSR 
internationally. A possible question to discover is in how far the institutional 
mechanisms led to an export of the EU’s perspective on CSR to its trade partner. 
Furthermore, it was beyond the scope of this paper to assess how far the exchange 
of information and best-practice led to an adjustment of initiatives and in how far it 
has triggered new initiatives in the private sector. As was mentioned in the fifth 
meeting, CSR initiatives in Korea are mainly carried out by the private sector. The 
effect on private sector-led initiatives would present an interesting area for future 
research. Further consideration should be given to the relevance of market 
governance in this context. 
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The presence of a representative of the International Labour Organization was 
identified as a contributing factor since it provided for information and technical 
assistance by the ILO. Furthermore, it led to dialogue between Korean and the ILO. 
The degree how far the EU is fostering engagement with international organizations 
through institutional mechanisms like the ones in TSD chapters is an area for future 
research.  
In total, it can be said that the process tracing contributed to the understanding of 
the functioning of the institutional mechanisms and its effectiveness and further 
outlined factors for further theory testing.  
When it comes to the generalizability of the findings, it has to be acknowledged 
that the results are to a degree specific to the EU-Korea trade agreement. The TSD 
chapters are constantly under assessment, adjusted to experiences and developed 
further by the European Commission. However, the basic institutional mechanisms 
have very similar structures in all EU TSD chapters. For example, the involvement 
of civil society differs across TSD chapters when it comes to the rules of procedure 
or frequency of the meetings (Martens et al. 2018) but all TSD chapters foresee 
advising civil society bodies. Especially, the suggested intervening factors might 
apply to TSD chapters in general. As was highlighted in previous research, even 
though the EU and U.S. approaches differ when it comes to the enforcement 
mechanisms, in practice both rely on network-based governance (Oehri 2015). 
Therefore, the findings can be applied to a certain degree to the U.S. model but also 
to other network-based models. The engagement of civil society is also foreseen in 
the U.S. model, for example in the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation (NAALC) which shares similarities with the EU intergovernmental 
TSD committee (Campling et al. 2016, p. 376). The findings suggested that the 
effectiveness of network-based governance varied across policy issue. Different 
factors were identified whose significance needs to be further tested for other 
agreements. 
To conclude, the findings in this paper suggest that improvements of the 
institutional mechanisms might be necessary to increase the effectiveness. Since it 
is an ongoing process, it remains to be seen how the mechanisms evolve over time 
and what the long-term effects will be. The relevance of the topic in a globalised 
world was emphasized by trade commissioner Malmström: “Ensuring our 
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agreements address the environment, labour rights, human rights and corruption is 
important. It is how we shape globalisation, so that it doesn't shape us” (European 
Commission 16 April 2018, p. 3). 
  
59 
 
Executive Summary 
The European Union has started in 2011 to add an additional chapter in its trade 
agreement which includes provisions on environmental protection and labour 
standards. This so-called chapter on trade and sustainable development (TSD) is 
part of the EU’s ‘new generation’ ‘modern’ trade agreements. The effectiveness of 
these kind of provisions has been questioned in academia as well as in the political 
sphere. However, this paper does not directly assess the effectiveness of the labour 
and environmental provisions in the TSD chapter. It starts from an earlier step in 
the process namely at the point of the implementation. It assesses the effectiveness 
of the institutional mechanisms created by the TSD chapter to monitor the 
implementation. The TSD chapters set up institutional structures to monitor the 
implementation. These structures and their interactions represent the institutional 
mechanisms of the TSD chapters and are the core of the analysis.  Contributing to 
both the academic and practical debate the paper researched the question: How 
effective are institutional mechanisms in EU trade and sustainable development 
chapters in contributing to the implementation of the chapters? The relevance of the 
questions is emphasized, when considering that well-functioning institutional 
mechanisms can lead to a better implementation of the chapter which in the end 
might affect the labour conditions and environmental situation on the ground.  
The institutional mechanisms in the TSD chapter consist of three main structures, 
an intergovernmental committee which is overseeing the implementation and is 
advised by two civil society bodies. The intergovernmental body is usually called 
‘trade and sustainable development committee’ (TSDC) or ‘sub-committee on trade 
and sustainable development’. The committee is supported in its monitoring 
function by civil society from the EU and the partner country. The civil society 
meets regularly in so-called ‘domestic advisory groups’ (DAGs) as well as in a 
broader set-up as ‘civil society forum’ (CSF). 
The research question is part of a bigger discussion on how effective the EU and 
also other countries are in exporting their rules and standards. The ‘external 
governance’ approach is serving as a conceptual framework for analysing the 
institutional mechanisms which oversee the implementation of the trade and 
sustainable development chapters. The aim is to assess how effective they are in 
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contributing to the successful export of provisions in the TSD chapter. The focus 
lies on the last step of a rule transfer, which is the implementation. The institutional 
mechanisms are regarded as effective, when they contribute to a more consistent 
implementation of the chapters.  
For the case of the EU-Korea free trade agreement which represents the blueprint 
case and first agreement with a TSD chapter, this paper process-traces the 
functioning of the institutional mechanisms in the TSD chapter and assesses its 
effectiveness. By looking at the official meeting documents of the institutional 
mechanisms and reports by the European institutions and by conducting interviews 
with the European participants in the meeting, the paper can assess in-depth the 
process of change.   
Due to the different nature of labour, environmental and cross-cutting issues the 
analysis was divided by six topics. The issues covered the ratification of ILO 
conventions (freedom of association, collective bargaining and forced labour), the 
implementation of ILO convention 111 on discrimination, emission trading 
schemes, illegal logging, circular economy and corporate social responsibility. The 
results show a diverse picture. The institutional mechanisms contributed to dialogue 
on the ratification of fundamental ILO conventions which Korea had not yet 
ratified. However, due the lack of concrete cooperation and steps towards the 
ratification, the effectiveness was evaluated as rather limited. The mechanisms were 
more effective and led to cooperation on the implementation of the ILO convention 
111 on discrimination. The convention has been ratified by Korea, but concerns 
have been raised on the implementation. The contribution is rated as effective in 
the case of emission trading schemes where the exchange in the mechanisms led to 
cooperation in a joint project. In the case of illegal logging the mechanisms led to 
dialogue but the EU side request to cooperate was not taken up. The mechanisms 
contributed further to dialogue and limited cooperation on circular economy. The 
intention to cooperate on corporate social responsibility was raised but has not been 
followed up yet. Since the mechanism did not lead to cooperation, the effectiveness 
is evaluated as rather limited.  
The process tracing further uncovered intervening factors which might foster or 
constrain the effectiveness such as politically sensitive issues, civil society 
engagement or the presence of representatives from international organizations at 
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meetings. The relevance of political willingness to address an issue and contested 
nature of labour issues in Korea was revealed in a dispute in the last civil society 
forum and the reluctance of the previous Korean government to discuss labour 
issues. Since labour issues are politically sensitive in Korea, dialogue and 
cooperation in the intergovernmental meetings and the ability of the civil society 
bodies to make concrete statements especially on the freedom of association and 
collective bargaining was hindered. Emission trading schemes represented almost 
the opposite case. The Korean side showed big interest in receiving advice from the 
European counterparts. The nature of the cooperation was very different than for 
labour issues and focused on Korea learning of the EU example.  
Furthermore, the degree of civil society engagement was identified as a possible 
intervening factor since it differed largely depending on the issue. On labour issues, 
the activity of civil society consisted mainly of pinpointing shortcomings in the 
implementation and to a less degree of the exchange of information on practices. 
This was the opposite for emission trading where the European civil society was 
giving mainly advice how the European system functions. Civil society was only 
limited engaged on corporate social responsibility issues and not at all on illegal 
logging. In total, the findings suggest that civil society involvement in the 
mechanisms itself depends on various factors among them the representativity and 
interest of civil society organizations. Another aspect is that the civil society 
mechanisms provide an opportunity for social dialogue which is normally not given 
in some countries. 
Another identified factor is the involvement of international organizations. The ILO 
presence in the intergovernmental and civil society meetings as well as the 
suggestions to Korea to work with the ILO contributed to dialogue with the ILO. 
The ILO was the international organizations with the deepest and most frequent 
involvement in the institutional mechanisms. However, the OECD’s national 
contact point in Korea was, for example, invited for a presentation which 
contributed to a better understanding of the OECD’s initiatives on corporate social 
responsibility.  
Relating the findings to the external governance approach, an interesting point is 
the request of the EU DAG and the European parliament to change from network 
governance to hierarchical governance by initiating the formal consultation process 
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on labour issues. In general, it can be said that the de-facto modes of governance 
were network-based and relied on co-operative mechanisms such as exchange of 
information, experience and best practice, joint studies and suggestion of joining 
international and domestic initiatives. 
The conducted research is constrained by some limitations in relation to 
comparability, intervening and external factors and the challenge of studying an 
ongoing process which makes a final assessment of effectiveness difficult and only 
allows for preliminary conclusions. 
In total, the process tracing contributed to the understanding of the functioning of 
the institutional mechanisms and its effectiveness and further outlined factors for 
further theory testing. 
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Appendix 1: Main interview questions to members of the 
EU domestic advisory group 
1. Can you tell me about the last meetings in Korea? What were the main issues being 
discussed? Was there progress in some areas? 
2. How are issues raised in the DAGs? Is it difficult to agree on an opinion together? 
3. What are the main concerns when it comes to the implementation of the TSD 
chapter in Korea? Were these issues raised by the DAGs and CSF? Did the Korea 
government act upon the issues? What has so far been the biggest success?  
4. How far did the TSD committee take DAG and CSF recommendations into 
account? What happened to the issues raised in the EU DAG letter to 
Commissioner Karel de Gucht and Malmström? Why has there been no formal 
government consultation? 
5. What happened in 2016? Why was there no CSF and CTSD? 
6. Would you say the TSD mechanisms are effective in ensuring that the TSD 
provisions are implemented by Korea? 
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Appendix 2: Main interview questions to the EU officials 
1. What were the main issues in the last TSDC and CSF meetings in Seoul? 
2. What has so far been the biggest success/achievements/biggest process in the TSD 
committee? 
3. What are the main concerns when it comes to the implementation of the TSD chapter 
in Korea? Were these issues raised with Korea in the TSD committee meeting and did 
Korea act upon the issues? 
4. The EU DAG and the European Parliament requested the starting of a governmental 
consultation on labour issues. Why did the Commission not start a formal consultation? 
5. What happened in 2016? Why was there no CSF and CTSD? 
6. How often do you interact with Korea on TSD issues outside of the formal meetings? 
7. Would you say the TSD committees (DAG, CSF, CTSD) are effective in ensuring that 
the TSD provisions are implemented by Korea? 
